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NOTE
Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata and
the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic
Lauren Salins* and Shepard Simpson**
Excessive incarceration is a national problem. Across the country,
prisons face dangerous levels of overcrowding, which has led to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and the inability of states to
effectively rehabilitate their inmates. Ardent public support of “tough
on crime” policies inhibits state legislatures from enacting successful
reforms. In turn, states spend large percentages of their budget to
sustain failing and ineffective corrections systems. By some estimates,
states could save hundreds of millions of dollars annually if they
reduced prison populations through proactive reforms, such as early
release programs and diversionary tactics. In light of these factors, a
consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata to
uphold an unprecedented prisoner release order is both timely and
necessary as the case approaches its two-year benchmark.
This Note argues that the Court’s holding in Brown did not overstep
the judicial boundaries imposed by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), but rather was a step in the right direction toward
acknowledging and remedying constitutional violations occurring in
California’s severely overcrowded prison system. Moreover, the
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Court’s analysis of PLRA will help courts navigate the statute’s
procedural requirements.
While California has made progress toward complying with Brown’s
prisoner release order, this seminal case sheds light on the need for
proactive reform in prison systems nationwide to prevent
unconstitutionally high levels of overcrowding in the first place. As
states are confronted with this new “release or reform” reality, this
Note will facilitate the much-needed discussion surrounding long-term
solutions to the overcrowding epidemic in U.S. prisons.
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INTRODUCTION
Up to 200 prisoners live in a gymnasium where only two guards
monitor their actions. 1 Fifty sick inmates remain in twelve-by-twentyfoot holding areas for hours while they wait to be seen by medical
staff. 2 Suicidal prisoners are caged in spaces the size of telephone
booths for prolonged periods of time, where they sit in pools of their
own urine. 3 Doctors prescribe and administer the wrong medications to
prisoners, which exacerbates health conditions and in some cases causes
death. 4 Communicable diseases spread easily, and operating rooms face
closure because existing medical spaces are excessively unsanitary. 5
One inmate murders another in the middle of an overcrowded prison,
unbeknownst to officials until hours later because they could not see
through the mass of prisoners. 6 These were the consequences of
California’s severely overburdened prison system for years.
On May 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata ordered
California to reduce its prison population by approximately 38,000 to
46,000 inmates. 7 The Court imposed the order to remedy
unconstitutional conditions of confinement that prevented the plaintiffs
from receiving adequate medical and mental healthcare. 8 Although the
1. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011). Additionally, as many as fifty-four inmates
shared one toilet. David G. Savage & Patrick McGreevy, State Ordered to Slash Inmate Levels,
L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A1.
2. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1925.
3. Id. at 1924. See Savage & McGreevy, supra note 1 (“A psychiatric expert reported
observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly [twenty-four] hours, standing in
a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic.”).
4. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *19
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Panel Report]. In 2004, a San Quentin prisoner who
suffered from hypertension, diabetes, and renal failure was prescribed medication that worsened
his condition. Id. The problem was not identified until a year later, just before the inmate died.
Id. Another inmate was given Pepto-Bismol when he complained of chest pains; by the end of
the day, he was found dead in his cell. Chris Megerian, Some Fear End to Federal Oversight of
Prison Care, L.A.TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1.
5. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *19.
6. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1933–34.
7. Id. at 1928.
8. Id. at 1947.
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claims in Brown focused on system-wide inefficiencies affecting the
distribution of adequate healthcare, overcrowding affects nearly all
aspects of incarceration, including sanitation, inmate security, and
access to rehabilitative programs. 9 These conditions necessitate
consideration of the Court’s remedial role in corrections and whether
reactive remedies, such as prisoner release orders, are effective in
addressing constitutional violations caused by prison overcrowding. 10
This Note argues that the Court’s holding in Brown did not overstep
the judicial boundaries imposed by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), but rather was a step in the right direction toward effectively
remedying serious constitutional violations in California’s severely
overcrowded prison system. Part I of this Note briefly explores prison
overcrowding nationally and in California. Part I also provides an
overview of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the prisoner rights
context, as well as PLRA’s process and implications. Part II then
summarizes the facts leading up to the three-judge panel’s prisoner
release order, which is followed by a discussion of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Brown.
Next, Part III provides a more in-depth assessment of the Court’s
interpretation and application of PLRA. In doing so, Part III affirms the
need for judicial intervention to remedy prison overcrowding, notes the
flexibility given to California to comply with Brown’s prisoner release
order, and discusses how reductions in prison populations generally can
reduce recidivism. Part IV then evaluates California’s efforts to comply
with Brown’s order as the two-year benchmark approaches.
Additionally, Part IV argues that states should not implement reactive
mechanisms to rectify prison overcrowding, but instead should employ
proactive sentencing and prison reforms to effectively remedy
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
I. BACKGROUND
Overcrowding in prisons across the nation has recently drawn more
attention to prisoners’ rights and their severely deficient living
conditions. As a result, litigation challenging conditions of confinement
has increased. Prior to exploring constitutional challenges to prison
conditions, it is important to understand why prisons across the United

9. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing factors that impact overcrowding); Brown, 131 S. Ct. at
1940 (“Even prisoners with no present physical or mental illness may become afflicted, and all
prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to provide inadequate care.”).
10. See infra Part I.B–C (discussing courts’ increasing involvement in corrections and
prisoner litigation).
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States have faced such severe levels of overcrowding. 11 This Part
describes the causes of excessive prison populations and explains how
overcrowding directly and adversely impacts conditions of confinement.
This Part then details Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of
prisoners’ rights. Lastly, this Part explains a pertinent legislative
response to prison overcrowding: Congress’s enactment of PLRA.
A. Prison Overcrowding and Conditions of Confinement
1. The Numbers
The U.S. prison population experienced a rapid influx between 1970
and 2007, growing by over 700% and effectively bringing the nation to
the global forefront as the world’s biggest incarcerator. 12 In 2008, 1 in
100 American adults was behind bars; 13 by 2009, 1 in 31 adults in the
United States was either incarcerated or on some form of probation.14
As of 2011, the United States imprisoned approximately 1.6 million
offenders, or about 25% of the world’s prison population, despite being
home to only 5% of the world’s population. 15
State costs associated with this population growth reached $52 billion
in 2011, making it the second biggest state budget consumer next to
Medicaid. 16 This increase in corrections spending, while necessary to
keep up with rising inmate populations, received significant public
attention and criticism, especially when states diverted funding from

11. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1922 (“After years of litigation, it became apparent that a remedy
for the constitutional violations would not be effective absent a reduction in the prison system
population.”).
12. See THE JFA INST., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S
PRISON POPULATION 1 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/
srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf (“A generation of growth has produced prison populations that are
now eight times what they were in 1970.”). See also Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs
Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (comparing the enormous prison population in
the U.S. with those of other countries); Ian Thompson, Step by Step in Fixing a Broken Criminal
Justice System, ACLU (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/step-step-fixingbroken-criminal-justice-system (“The U.S. currently has the dubious distinction of being, by far,
the world’s largest incarcerator, both in sheer numbers and in terms of percentage of the
population.”).
13. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF
AMERICA’S PRISONS 1 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR], available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/
State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf.
14. Id.
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 2 (Nov. 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpus11.pdf; Combating Mass Incarceration—The Facts, ACLU (June 17, 2011), http://www.
aclu.org/combating-mass-incarceration-facts-0.
16. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 1.
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other necessities, such as education. 17 Also notable is that despite
increased corrections spending over the past few decades, national
recidivism rates have remained relatively steady. 18
California became an extreme example of this national problem due
to the extraordinarily rapid increase in its prison population. 19 Between
1980 and 2006, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) experienced a 600% increase in its inmate
population, growing from 27,916 to 161,000. 20 Faced with a surging
prisoner population, California struggled to acquire the requisite
funding to match rapidly rising costs—partly due to the State’s budget
deficit and partly because of resistance from the public sector. 21
Fueling this fiscal problem was the high cost of incarcerating an
inmate in California. In 2005, the annual cost to incarcerate an adult
prisoner in California, approximately $34,150, was 35% higher than the
national average. 22 The cost of incarcerating a juvenile offender was
17. See BENENSON STRATEGY GRP., NATIONAL RESEARCH OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON CRIME
PUNISHMENT 3 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.mcohio.org/services/fcfc/exoffender
_reentry/docs/PSPP_National_Research_web.pdf (“Voters would prefer to cut prison spending
than cut K-12 education, higher education or health care, or raise property or business taxes.”);
Steven Hawkins, Education vs. Incarceration, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), http://prospect.org/
article/education-vs-incarceration (critiquing states’ increasing expenditures on incarceration over
education, especially when the economic downturn has limited state spending). See also Sharon
Dolovich, Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 240 & n.23 (2009)
(arguing that America’s “style” of incarceration does not reduce crime and promote public safety
to expected levels but rather expends funds that could be “spent on more socially productive
enterprises”).
18. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 9.
19. Craig M. Bradley, The Right Remedy for Crowded Prisons, 47 TRIAL 54, 56 (Aug. 2011).
Between 1991 and 2001, California’s incarceration rate increased by 42.5%. Id.
20. Brief of Corrections and Law Enforcement Personnel Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 14, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09-1233) [hereinafter Amici Curiae
CLEP].
21. The Governor’s 2011–2012 proposed budget entailed a $150 million cut from adult and
parole programs in light of the State’s financial difficulties. Governor Announces Proposed
2011-2012 Budget for State, CDCR, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. (Jan. 17, 2011), http://
www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/This_Week/CDCR%20This%20Week%20January%2017%20%202011
bfnl.pdf. The correctional budgetary strains have been described as follows:
As the number of inmates has burgeoned, correctional budgets have been strained by
many factors. Larger prison populations have led to the construction of more prisons
with associated staffing and overhead expenses. More prisoners has also meant higher
costs for basic necessities, along with increased costs for “optional” programming,
such as GED instruction, vocational training, and drug and alcohol rehabilitation.
Significant, too, has been the rapidly rising cost of delivering even rudimentary health
care—a cost states bear in full for those within their custody.
Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence
Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 469 (2010)
(footnotes omitted).
22. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIM. &
AND
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almost twice this amount. 23 As of the 2009–2010 fiscal year, the
average annual cost per adult offender reached $46,700. 24 Despite these
figures, inmate populations in California continued to grow, reaching an
all-time high in 2008 when prisons were filled on average to 200% of
their design capacity (some even to 300%). 25
2. Causes and Implications
Although there are a number of factors that contribute to high prison
populations nationally and in California, such as a growing populace,26
overwhelming consensus points to the public’s “lock them up and throw
away the key” mentality as the primary culprit. 27 Legislatures,
prompted by their constituents, have incorporated this perspective into
policy decisions over the past several decades. 28 Strict determinate
sentencing policies, including mandatory minimums, 29 habitual
JUST. 207, 222 (2008); JUSTICE POLICY INST., PROPOSITION 36: FIVE YEARS LATER 24 (Apr.
2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/prop36.pdf.
23. Petersilia, supra note 22, at 222. Incarcerating juveniles is typically more expensive
because juvenile correctional facilities house smaller populations and the offenders are held in
smaller, decentralized units that require more space and more staff to monitor. SHARI MILLERJOHNSON & JOEL ROSCH, CTR. FOR CHILD & FAMILY POLICY, JUVENILE OR ADULT?
ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS AND THE LINE BETWEEN THE JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 23 (2007), available at http://www.childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/pdfs/familyimpact/
2007/BriefingReport_07.pdf.
24. MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 2011 CAL FACTS 55 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/calfacts/calfacts_010511.pdf. Most inmate costs
were related to security and healthcare during this time. Id. Compare this cost figure to the
national average of $28,817. Adam Skolnick, Runaway Prison Costs Trash State Budgets, THE
FISCAL TIMES (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/02/09/
Runaway-Prison-Costs-Thrash-State-Budgets.aspx#page1.
25. See Blake P. Sercye, Comment, “Need-Narrowness-Intrusiveness” under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 471 (stating that California’s prison
system is severely overcrowded and that experts concede that “overcrowding in CDCR facilities
[makes] providing appropriate physical and mental health care nearly impossible”). See also
Amici Curiae CLEP, supra note 20, at 15 (“At a time when the largest prison in CDCR system
had a design capacity of 3,900 inmates, there were fourteen CDCR prisons housing over 5,000
inmates. Several, in fact, held upward of 7,000 inmates.” (citations omitted)).
26. For example, California’s population rose from 33,871,648 in 2000 to 37,253,956 in 2010.
State & County Quickfacts, U.S DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last revised Jan. 10, 2013).
27. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (Jan. 1999), available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
28. See Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 414–18 (discussing punitive policies of the 1980s and 1990s).
29. Mandatory minimums refer to minimum punishments set by Congress, which require that
every judge “impose [them] on every offender who meets the statutory criteria, regardless of any
other facts in the case.” BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS
2 (1994), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/conmanmin.pdf/$file/conman
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offender laws (such as “three-strikes” rules), 30 and truth-in-sentencing
mandates31 have placed more offenders behind bars for longer periods
of time. 32 Furthermore, the “war-on-drugs” movement has criminalized
certain drug-related activities that were not previously unlawful, which
has led to even higher statewide incarceration rates. 33
Strict parole policies also contribute to higher incarceration rates.34
For example, California mandates stringent post-release oversight and
imposes a number of probationary conditions on parolees. 35 As a result,
California’s inmates are imprisoned for longer terms and face a greater
likelihood of returning to prison for parole violations. 36 In 2007, 61%
of the inmates entering the California prison system represented
parolees who had violated their terms. 37 Furthermore, there is often
little logic to the punishments imposed for parole violations. For
example, parolees who commit purely technical violations, such as
failing to show up on time to a parole meeting, are typically sentenced
to upwards of four months, while offenders who return to prison for
min.pdf.
30. Three-strikes laws require an offender to serve a minimum sentence after committing three
offenses (typically felonies) proscribed by the law. California’s three-strikes law, prior to voter
approval of Proposition 36 in 2012, provided that a defendant who has been convicted of two
prior felonies is subject to a minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for any third
felony conviction. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999). Proposition 36 revised the
law to impose life sentences only where new felony convictions were serious or violent.
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11999.4-.14 (West 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 3063.1 (West 2012)).
31. Truth-in-sentencing laws mandate that offenders serve a substantial (and often
predetermined) portion of their sentence before a judge will consider parole eligibility. DITTON
& WILSON, supra note 27, at 1.
32. Determinate sentencing, in its basic form, requires judges to adhere to strict sentencing
guidelines (i.e., longer sentences than judges would otherwise impose), which ultimately limits
the judiciary’s discretion in sentencing. MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO
INCARCERATE 152 (2006).
33. See John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the
Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189, 190 (2005).
34. Sara Mayeux, The Origins of Back-End Sentencing in California: A Dispatch from the
Archives, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 529 (2011).
35. Id. at 529–32. In California, parolees are frequently and quickly returned to prison for
minor parole violations, such as missing a meeting or failing a drug test. Id. at 530. In 2009, “the
odds that a California parolee would be returned to prison at least once during a three-year parole
term were 70%.” Id. at 531.
36. Id. at 536. It is notable that at
a time when police officers and prosecutors felt increasingly constrained by judicial
decisions at both the federal and state level that expanded the rights of criminal
defendants, California parole officers offered themselves as a workaround, a way of
sending dangerous people to prison without having to go through the plea bargaining
and trial process.
Id. at 537.
37. Petersilia, supra note 22, at 218.
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committing more serious infractions, like failing a drug test, serve ten
months on average. 38
The preceding statistics are clear: America’s corrections systems are
expensive, and the sentencing structures in both the United States and
California lead to an ever-growing number of prisoners. 39 Although
state spending on corrections has increased dramatically over the past
few decades, it has failed to reach a level sufficient to support and
expand the needed infrastructure to match the population influx. 40 The
resulting effect has been grossly overcrowded prisons. 41
Overpopulation and aging prison facilities directly and negatively
affect inmates’ living conditions. 42 In addition to the expenses and
difficulties prisons face in accommodating population increases,
overcrowding also imposes emotional and physical costs on inmates. 43
Overcrowding can lead to double-celling inmates, random housing
assignments without proper assessments, deterioration of facilities, poor
staff retention, and unsanitary conditions. 44 Furthermore, without
adequate resources, medical issues and symptoms can remain
unaddressed and undiagnosed. 45 Finally, overcrowding often impairs
38. Mayeux, supra note 34, at 531.
39. See PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 1 (noting the costs associated with
prison population growth are now approximately $52 billion annually); Craig Haney, The Wages
of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional
Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 269 (2006) (explaining how the influx in the prison
population in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a growth that became so large that it made it
difficult for prison officials to keep track of and effectively supervise all of the facilities in their
system).
40. See Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 163, 169 (1999)
(noting that inmate populations between 1990 and 1995 rose disproportionately higher than
correctional facilities’ capacities). States have frequently increased prison capacities without also
increasing the needed infrastructure. Haney, supra note 39, at 266–67. While populations grew,
programming, medical, and mental health resources did not. Id. at 266.
41. See Haney, supra note 39, at 266–67 (noting that overcrowding defines the extent to
which a facility houses more prisoners than its infrastructure can humanely support).
42. Susanna Y. Chung, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment
Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2351 (2000).
43. See Mary D. Fan, Beyond the Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. 581, 597 (2012) (referring to California’s overcrowded prison system as being in a
state of “fiscal and humanitarian crisis”).
44. Chung, supra note 42, at 2352. See Amici Curiae CLEP, supra note 20, at 18
(“[O]vercrowding creates a ‘situation where the demand [for medical care] significantly
outstretches the ability to respond to the healthcare needs, both in terms of timing and actual
service.’” (citation omitted)).
45. See Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison
Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 313, 331 (1983)
(noting that one of the biggest challenges faced by prison administrators in the 1980s was the lack
of order, which diverted their attention from other pressing matters); California Can Relieve
Packed Prisons without Eroding Safety, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 24, 2011),
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the supervisory capacity of staff, which in turn leads to chaotic prison
environments and diminishes the corrections system’s ability to reduce
recidivism. 46 Despite these consequences, the overcrowding dilemma
is hardly a new development. Studies have been predicting a prisonovercrowding crisis for decades. 47
B. Judicial Response to Prison Overcrowding
Traditionally, courts treated conditions of confinement cases in a
hands-off manner due in large part to avoid interfering with the
legislative administration of corrections. 48 Beginning in the late 1960s,
however, courts transitioned to a more hands-on approach with respect
to inmates’ rights as the need for prison reform began to outweigh
separation of powers concerns. 49
In a string of cases decided during this transitional period, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the unconstitutionality of prison conditions
and inmate treatment. 50 Through these initial cases, which included
challenges against deprivation of good time credits 51 and punitive

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0524/California-can-relievepacked-prisons-without-eroding-safety (noting that the district court in Plata “found that a
California prisoner needlessly dies every six or seven days ‘due to constitutional deficiencies’”).
46. Haney, supra note 39, at 284. From 2004 to 2007, California’s recidivism rate was
approximately 58%. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 10. During 2007, about
16% of 1,180,469 individuals on parole nationwide returned to prison. Recidivism, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 (last visited Mar. 17,
2013).
47. Amici Curiae CLEP, supra note 20, at 11. See Haney, supra note 39, at 267 (“[T]he
problems we now face were repeatedly predicted and certainly could have been avoided if the
many early warnings had been heeded.”).
48. See Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive
Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 298 (2008)
(stating that the foundation for the judiciary’s initial hands-off approach stemmed from lack of
corrections expertise and fear that “intervention by the courts [would] subvert prison discipline”).
But see Thornberry & Call, supra note 45, at 313–14 (providing that the “traditional hands off
approach of courts facing prison cases gave way to judicial activism” in the 1960s); JIM THOMAS,
PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 83–84 (1988) (stating that the
hands-off doctrine was a byproduct of separation of state and federal powers, lack of judicial
expertise in corrections, and fear that judicial interference would undermine correction officials’
authority).
49. A transition occurred when the Warren Court “further nationalized civil liberties by
challenging abusive criminal justice practices of states which appeared to run counter to
Constitutional principles.” THOMAS, supra note 48, at 45. See also Chung, supra note 42, at
2358 (noting that in the 1960s and 1970s, courts departed from the hands-off approach).
50. See infra notes 52–63 and accompanying text (discussing exemplary cases where courts
exercised jurisdiction in prisoner litigation cases).
51. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (upholding an inmate’s
challenge to the constitutionality of the Nebraska prison system’s deprivation of good-time
credits on Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
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confinement conditions, 52 the Court indicated its willingness to address
issues related to prison administration and prisoners’ rights. 53 The
Court’s assertion that “there is no Iron Curtain between the Constitution
and the prisons of this country” indicated its newfound approach: the
Court would not recuse itself from cases considering prisoners’ claims
solely on the basis of state legislatures’ traditionally discretionary role
in corrections administration. 54
Shortly thereafter, the Court heard a number of cases in which
prisoners alleged Eighth Amendment violations. 55 Although the Court
recognized that offenders face limitations on their personal liberties as a
primary consequence of criminal behavior, 56 the Eighth Amendment
guarantees inmates a basic level of rights and protections from cruel and
unusual punishment. 57 Consequently, the Constitution requires prison
systems and officials to provide inmates with necessities, such as

52. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978) (finding that isolated confinement
as a form of punishment was subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny).
53. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–415, 419 (1974) (holding that the decision
to censor or withhold delivery of prisoners’ mail had to be accompanied by at least minimal
safeguards, and that bans against attorney-client interviews conducted by law student or legal
paraprofessionals “constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the inmates’ right of access to the
courts”), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979) (“Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of
inmates and corrections personnel . . . [hence] the [challenged] practice [or condition] must be
evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration.”); Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at
407 (“[P]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.” (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987))); Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (affirming that treatment of prisoners in correctional facilities is subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny).
54. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
55. See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (detailing the Court’s objective and
subjective frameworks in assessing prisoner litigation claims).
56. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (“In seeking a
mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives (of prisons) and the provisions
of the Constitution . . . , this Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a
prisoner’s rights.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). See also Substantive Rights
Retained by Prisoners, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 943, 959 (2008) (“The Supreme
Court has stated . . . that harsh conditions and rough disciplinary treatment are part of the price
that convicted individuals must pay for their offenses against society.”).
57. The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Robinson
v. California, the Court applied the Eighth Amendment to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). See also Brown v. Plata, 131
S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons”);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))
(“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man” as
measured by evolving standards of society); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)
(emphasizing that the state is required to ensure humane conditions of confinement).
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clothing, food, shelter, and medical care. 58
While corrections officials must uphold prisoners’ constitutional
rights, courts have issued conflicting decisions regarding what degree of
rights-deprivation constituted an Eighth Amendment violation within
the prison context. 59 In addressing alleged Eighth Amendment
violations, the Supreme Court established two non-definitive tests to
evaluate the validity of a prisoner’s claim. 60 Objectively, as established
in Rhodes v. Chapman, 61 the challenged conditions must be sufficiently
serious such that they deprive inmates of basic life necessities in order
to constitute cruel and unusual treatment. Subjectively, as put forth by
the Court in Estelle v. Gamble 62 and Wilson v. Seiter, 63 prison officials
must have had knowledge of, and disregarded, the excessive risk to the
prisoners’ health and safety posed by the unconstitutional conditions.
Despite establishing these objective and subjective standards, the
Court did not provide lower courts with a cohesive framework to
analyze these standards in cases involving prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment rights, especially with respect to the objective test
established in Rhodes. 64 On the one hand, some courts follow a totality
of circumstances approach and analyze whether conditions as a whole
are in accord with constitutional guarantees. 65 Under this approach,
58. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103–04 (1976) (recognizing prisoners’ right to healthcare in the prison setting); Petersilia, supra
note 22, at 240 (noting that the failure to provide sufficient medical care constitutes deliberate
indifference to inmates’ serious healthcare needs).
59. See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Amendment
framework as put forth by the Court).
60. See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing the totality of circumstances and
core-conditions approaches).
61. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S 337, 347 (1996). The Court in Rhodes held that doublecelling inmates did not violate the Eighth Amendment because there was insufficient evidence
showing that double-celling was in fact harming the inmates. Id. at 352.
62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The Court stated: “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Id. See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828–29 (adopting Estelle’s deliberate
indifference test to assess the prisoner-plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights).
63. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). In Wilson, the plaintiff alleged that conditions
of confinement—such as overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating and cooling, and
housing with mentally and physically ill inmates—were unsanitary, unsafe, and unconstitutional.
Id. at 296. The Court found that the lower court should have considered the prison official’s
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s plight and therefore remanded the case. Id. at 305–06.
64. See Chung, supra note 42, at 2361 (explaining that the Court did not identify exactly what
constitutes a deprivation of a single human need, and therefore analytical gaps remained after the
ruling). Consequently, lower courts have created differing standards for determining whether
certain prison conditions, viewed together, violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.
65. Rhodes, 452 U.S at 347. The totality of circumstances approach involves courts making
constitutional violation determinations on a case-by-case basis and considers whether the
condition(s) “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. As an
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courts look not only at basic necessities, such as adequate food and
safety, but also at the day-to-day life of the prisoners, including
recreational and rehabilitative opportunities. 66 On the other hand, some
courts use a core-conditions approach and look solely at whether a
prison adequately provides basic inmate necessities, including safety,
shelter, sanitation, and healthcare. 67 Under both approaches, however,
courts have consistently held that overcrowded prisons combined with
unsanitary and unsafe conditions violate inmates’ Eighth Amendment
rights. 68
C. PLRA’s Purpose and Requirements
With the understanding that prisoners could seek legal redress if
prison administrators violated their constitutional rights, inmates began
to increasingly file federal court claims. 69 Organizations such as the

example of how the Third Circuit has interpreted this approach, see Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d
418, 432 (3d Cir. 1990) (determining that an “overcrowded, dilapidated, and unsanitary” prison
infringed on the Eighth Amendment rights of its prisoners because it offended current notions of
human decency).
66. Chung, supra note 42, at 2362.
67. Id. at 2366–68. Courts using the core-conditions approach must identify specific,
inadequately provided, enumerated conditions in order to find an Eighth Amendment violation.
Id. These core conditions consist of deprivations of food, clothing, medical care, safety, and
shelter. Id. Furthermore, one core condition must be sufficiently inadequate to merit a finding of
constitutional violation; several subpar conditions that do not on their own reach a level of cruel
and unusual punishment cannot be combined to reach an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. See
also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246–47 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that basic conditions must
be assessed independently to see if each reaches a level of inadequacy necessary to find an Eighth
Amendment violation). It is noteworthy to mention that mental healthcare is not a core condition
and is not considered by courts in this approach. Chung, supra note 42, at 2366–68.
68. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 821–27 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary
judgment where plaintiff’s claim alleged overcrowding and unsanitary conditions when he was
confined to a twenty-by-twenty-foot cell designed to fit four people with eleven other inmates,
and inmates were required to walk on floors flooded with sewage). But see Chandler v. Crosby,
379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that high temperatures in Florida’s prisons is not
an extreme deprivation that meets the level of an Eighth Amendment violation). See Edward J.
Hanlon, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 24 AM. JURIS. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 7
(“Courts have often stated that overcrowding is not, per se, a violation of inmates’ rights.
Whether overcrowding rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a determination as
to whether this condition causes inmates to endure genuine deprivations and hardship given the
‘totality of circumstances’ of confinement.” (footnotes omitted)).
69. Sercye, supra note 25, at 471–72. See also Kristen S. Coy, Note, Exhaustion under the
PLRA: Reinforcing the Rehabilitative Function of American Prisons, 14 WIDENER L.J. 989, 996
(2005) (“The legislative record surrounding the adoption of the PLRA is replete with references
discouraging frivolous prisoner civil rights claims.”); Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner
Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520–21 (1996) (describing
the compilation of a “Top Ten Frivolous Filings List,” which contained a case in which a prisoner
sued under PLRA after the prison charged his inmate account for the wrong kind of peanut
butter).
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American Civil Liberties Union, which from the 1970s onwards
spearheaded campaigns to push prisoner rights litigation into courts,
fueled this movement. 70 As a result, the numbers of frivolous claims
and the requisite costs to litigate these matters increased exponentially,
which incited Congress to enact PLRA. 71
Congress intended for PLRA to counteract the current of frivolous
prisoner litigation and to curtail perceived abuses of the judicial system
by restricting the scope of relief available to prisoner-plaintiffs. 72 To
address these issues, PLRA established a comprehensive set of
standards that courts must apply to determine prospective relief in
conditions-of-confinement cases. 73 For example, PLRA’s exhaustion
provision requires that inmates use all prison administrative avenues
prior to filing a civil rights claim. 74 Most relevant to the Brown case,
70. See generally Prisoner Litigation, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/search/prisoner%20litiga
tion?show_aff=1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (providing examples of ACLU’s involvement in
prisoners’ rights throughout the past decade).
71. See Coy, supra note 69, at 997 (noting that the total cost per year for all states to defend
prisoner law suits was $81 million in 1995). See also Shay & Kalb, supra note 48, at 299 (noting
that Congress enacted PLRA in the “midst of America’s prison boom” and that PLRA’s “stated
purpose was to reduce frivolous inmate litigation and over-reaching by federal courts”). By 2000,
five years after the passage of PLRA, prisoner suits decreased by 39%. See Brief Amicus Curiae
of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Appellants at 13, Brown v. Plata, 131 S.
Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09-1233) (“PLRA . . . arose from a deep public dissatisfaction with the way
the federal courts had handled prison litigation. The three-judge court provision was considered
among the important new requirements . . . .” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). In
essence, PLRA was an expansion of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person’s Act (CRIPA) of
1980, which allowed a 180-day suspension of claims to ensure that all administrative remedies
had been exhausted by the prisoner prior to seeking judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(2006) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), e(e). See Shay & Kalb, supra note 48, at 301 (describing PLRA’s
limiting provisions, including a “three-strikes” rule that prohibited prisoners from filing more
complaints following three that were frivolous, malicious, or did not state a claim upon which
relief could be granted; a provision that required even indigent prisoners to pay filing fees; and a
statement that prohibits recovery for mental or emotional injury without a showing of physical
injury).
73. Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Eighth Amendment—Eastern District of California
Holds That Prisoner Release Is Necessary to Remedy Unconstitutional California Prison
Conditions, 123 HARV. L. REV. 752, 752 (2010) [hereinafter Recent Case, Constitutional Law].
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing complaints in federal court. However, the term “exhaustion” has been indecisively
interpreted, and issues regarding whether a procedural default component is incorporated into
PLRA have arisen. In other words, the issue before federal courts is whether failure by a prisoner
to completely exhaust all administrative grievance procedures bars relief even if no other relief is
available. Coy, supra note 69, at 994. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103 (2006)
(holding that PLRA incorporates a procedural default component). Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C.
provides the right of action to individuals whose constitutional rights have been infringed and
states in part that:
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PLRA created a requirement that prisoner release orders remain
remedies of last resort. 75 PLRA’s prisoner release order process
requires that a three-judge panel determine whether such an order is
necessary and narrowly tailored to address the constitutional violations
stemming from confinement conditions. 76 As defined in PLRA, the
term “prisoner release order” does not solely refer to an order that
instructs a state to release inmates, but also includes other forms of
injunctive relief, such as population caps. 77
Before a panel may be convened, however, the district court must: (1)
enter an order for less intrusive relief; 78 (2) determine that the relief
failed to remedy the constitutional violation after a reasonable allocation
of time; 79 (3) find clear and convincing evidence that overcrowding was
the primary cause of the violation; 80 and (4) determine that no other
relief would remedy the violation such that the order is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. 81
Contention arose from both PLRA’s restrictions on court intervention
in corrections administration and the long-standing, overarching debate
over the federal court system’s appropriate role in addressing prisoner
abuse by prison officials. 82 PLRA, however, does not entirely foreclose
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (2006). See Recent Case, Constitutional Law, supra note 73, at
752 (asserting PLRA’s provisions were intended to make prisoner release orders remedies of last
resort). See also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011) (stating that PLRA serves to
restrict the circumstances under which a court may enter an order that effectively caps the prison
population).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The federal judge who oversees the case—on his or her own
initiative or upon by plaintiff’s request—may request the convention of a three-judge court to
determine whether a prisoner release order should be entered. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(C)–(D).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (describing the procedure for convening a three-judge panel).
77. Under PLRA, a prisoner release order includes any order, including a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or
limiting the prison population or that directs the release from or non-admission of prisoners to a
prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). In other words, PLRA’s definition of prisoner release order
includes orders that affect prison populations without necessarily requiring release. See Sercye,
supra note 25, at 475 (defining prisoner release order as encompassing temporary restraining
orders or ones that provide temporary injunctive relief).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2), (3)(E)(ii). The public safety consideration is part of the narrowly
drawn and tailored requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
82. See Shay & Kalb, supra note 48, at 297 (referring to PLRA as “closing of the courthouse
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orders that limit prison populations. 83 Instead, the dramatic increase in
prison populations and the unconstitutional conditions of confinement
that result from overcrowding provided a foundation for PLRA’s
application, allowing for heightened judicial intervention in the
corrections sector. 84
II. DISCUSSION
California’s prisons have consistently failed to effectively administer
mental health and medical care services to inmates. 85 This grim reality
sparked a series of cases that confronted whether a reduction in prison
population was necessary to cure Eighth Amendment violations in
California’s corrections system. This Part begins with an overview of
two class action lawsuits—Coleman v. Wilson and Plata v.
Schwarzenegger—which were later consolidated in Brown v. Plata.
This Part then discusses the three-judge panel’s order to reduce
California’s prison population. Finally, this Part summarizes the
Court’s majority opinion in Brown and provides an overview of the
objections raised by Justices Scalia and Alito in dissent.
A. The Precursor Cases to Brown v. Plata
1. Coleman v. Wilson
In the early 1990s, a class of inmates in Coleman v. Wilson alleged
that inadequate mental healthcare services in California’s prison system
gave rise to Eighth Amendment violations. 86 The Coleman court held
door”). See also Ronald L. Goldfarb & Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181–82 (1970) (discussing the controversy surrounding the Court’s
hands-off approach).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, no court
shall enter a prisoner release order unless (i) a court has previously entered an order for less
intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be
remedied through the prisoner release order; and (ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount
of time to comply with the previous court orders.”); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1937 (2011)
(“Congress limited the availability of limits on prison populations, but it did not forbid these
measures altogether.”).
84. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (interpreting PLRA’s automatic stay
provision); Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding PLRA constitutional
and not “lightly assuming” Congress would infringe on constitutional rights); Tyler v. Murphy,
135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998) (assessing whether ordered injunctive relief was in compliance
with PLRA’s provisions, and holding that a prisoner release order cannot be imposed unless the
three-judge court makes findings consistent with PLRA’s requirements).
85. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, TIME IS RUNNING OUT, at i (2010), available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/185/Report185.pdf (stating that California consistently failed to
provide constitutionally adequate prisons and that its “time ha[d] run out” to remedy the situation
on its own).
86. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
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for the plaintiffs and determined that several constitutional deficiencies
existed in the administration of mental healthcare, including delays in
access to treatment, inadequate screening and assessment tools, and
inefficient distribution of medication. 87
Based on these findings, the court ordered CDCR to develop
remedial plans under the supervision of a court-appointed Special
Master. 88 Despite the Special Master’s efforts, 89 the Coleman court
reconvened twelve years later and found overwhelming evidence that
overcrowding in California prisons caused systematic failure in mental
health treatment. 90 Serious shortages in staff persisted, and inmates
whose ailments posed a danger to themselves and others still waited
indefinite lengths of time for treatment. 91
2. Plata v. Schwarzenegger
In 2005, another class of prisoner-plaintiffs filed a claim against the
State of California in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, alleging that
inadequacies in the provision of medical healthcare services in the
State’s prisons violated their Eighth Amendment rights. 92 After a series
of negotiations, the parties ultimately reached an agreement for
injunctive relief that required the State to formulate a remedial plan

87. Id. at 1308–15. The court found that some prisoners went years without necessary
medical attention. Id. at 1316. It also found chronic understaffing and an inadequate recordkeeping system. Id. at 1308–15.
88. Id. at 1323–24. A Special Master is a judicial officer appointed by the court to oversee
and monitor a party’s compliance with judicial orders. FED. R. CIV. P. 53. In PLRA cases,
Special Masters are authorized to conduct hearings, prepare proposed findings of fact, and assist
with the development of remedial plans. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f)(6) (2006). Eighteen months after
his appointment in 2005, the Special Master in Coleman submitted a report outlining his proposed
remedial plans, the “Health Services Delivery System Program Guides,” which the court
accepted. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *26.
89. The main focus of the efforts was to develop a reliable screening process and find the
needed staff and space to accommodate inmates with serious medical needs. See Panel Report,
supra note 4, at *27–33 (“[T]he court has repeatedly ordered defendants to create the necessary
positions and to hire staff to fill those positions.”)
90. See id. at *28 (noting that once improvements were made in the screening process, it
became obvious that much more space was needed in order to accommodate all the inmates with
serious mental disorders).
91. See id. at *23–24, *35 (noting that constant systematic failures made it difficult for CDCR
to retain competent medical staff). See also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1934–35 (2011)
(explaining why overcrowding caused chaos and inmate suffering in the CDCR system).
92. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
3, 2005). For example, a prisoner who reported fever and chills did not receive proper
medication, ultimately resulting in his death. Id. at *4–5. In an investigation into his death, one
doctor stated that the course of treatment administered to the inmate was “the most reckless and
grossly negligent behavior [he had] ever seen by a physician.” Id. at *5 (internal quotations
omitted).
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supervised by correctional experts. 93 Three years later, however,
overall compliance with the stipulated order was virtually non-existent,
and the appalling conditions persisted. 94 The Plata court concluded that
it had no alternative but to place CDCR’s medical healthcare system
under the supervision of a court-appointed Receiver. 95 But after seven
years of remedial efforts, 96 the Receiver found that the necessary
improvements had not been made and life-threatening conditions
persisted throughout California’s prison system. 97
B. Consolidation before a Three-Judge Panel
Overcrowding in California’s prisons led former Governor
Schwarzenegger to declare the system in a state of emergency. 98 In his
Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, the Governor
stated that “all [thirty-three] of [California’s] prisons are now at or
above maximum operational capacity and [twenty-nine] prisons are so
overcrowded . . . [that they] pose substantial safety risks.” 99 Following
this proclamation, Plata’s Receiver and Coleman’s Special Master
93. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *11–12. The stipulated policies and procedures were
extensive: 800 pages in 11 volumes. Id. at *12. For example, they required that California
construct five new prisons a year and provide audits of inmate health records, and they were to be
implemented on a step-by-step basis with the goal of gradually relieving the devastating pressure
overcrowding placed on the prison system. Id. at *12–13.
94. Id. at *13. As of May 2005, when the court expected the stipulated remedial policies and
procedures to be completed in twelve prisons, not a single prison was in compliance. Id. As the
district court in Plata stated:
The harm already done in this case to California’s prison inmate population could not
be more grave . . . . The Court has given defendants every reasonable opportunity to
bring its prison medical system to constitutional standards, and it is beyond reasonable
dispute that the State has failed. . . . [O]n average, an inmate in one of California’s
prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the
CDCR’s medical delivery system. This statistic, awful as it is, barely provides a
window into the waste of human life occurring behind California’s prison walls . . . .
Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1. See also Panel Report, supra note 4, at *14 (explaining that in
2005, the plaintiffs produced reports from San Quentin Prison that indicated various instances of
“incompetence, indifference, cruelty, and neglect in the medical services offered by the prison”).
95. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *10. When the court places a prison system in Receivership,
the Receiver not only has monitoring authority like a Special Master, but is also given
administrative authority within the prison system to carry out changes that he or she deems
necessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 3103 (2006) (discussing the appointment procedures and role of a
Receiver).
96. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *21. There were two Receivers appointed in succession.
Id. The Receivers ultimately implemented a new pharmacy system, instituted pilot programs to
improve screening and chronic care management, and recruited and retained clinical staff. Id.
97. Id. at *181–82.
98. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, OFFICE
OF THE GOVERNOR (Oct. 4, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 [hereinafter State of
Emergency Proclamation].
99. Id.
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independently determined that a reduction in California’s state prison
population was necessary to eliminate Eighth Amendment violations
occurring in CDCR facilities. 100 The Ninth Circuit granted motions to
convene a three-judge panel, and soon thereafter the cases were
consolidated and transferred to a three-judge panel in Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger. 101
After fourteen days of testimony, the panel issued a 184-page report
ordering a reduction in California’s prison population to 137.5% of the
system’s design capacity—a decrease of about 38,000 to 46,000
prisoners—within two years. 102 The panel emphasized that, although
the Constitution does not require California to provide its inmates with
“state-of-the-art medical and mental health care,” it does require the
State to provide care consistent with civilized standards of society and
to prevent unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or death. 103 The
court found that California’s prison system, which it referred to as
“bursting at the seams,” denied the plaintiff classes these constitutional
guarantees. 104 The panel deemed overcrowding a significant and
widespread source of the problem. 105
The court gave California discretion in structuring targeted and
effective remedial methods to comply with the panel’s decision, as well
as the option to move to modify the order in the future. 106 Essentially,
the court held that California could take any avenue it deemed prudent
in drastically downsizing the inmate population of state prisons,
including construction of new facilities or inmate transfers. 107 In

100. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *46–48.
101. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2007 WL 2122657, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2008). See Panel Report, supra note 4, at *48. The Plata court recommended consolidation to
ensure “judicial economy” and to avoid “the risk of inconsistent judgments.” Id. See 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(3)(C) (2006) (“A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal court shall file with
any request for such relief, a request for a three-judge court . . . .”). See generally Bowring v.
Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the right to medical care for physical
illness is coextensive with the right to psychological or psychiatric care).
102. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *120; Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
103. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *6.
104. Id. at *6–7. See also supra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s Eighth Amendment
application to prisoner claims).
105. The widespread overcrowding in CDCR, approximately 190% of system-wide design
capacity, was “extraordinary” and “almost unheard of.” Panel Report, supra note 4, at *55
(internal quotations omitted). The Special Master and Receiver further confirmed this finding.
Id. at *46–48. See Plata, 2007 WL 2122657, at *3 (stating California had ample time to remedy
prison overcrowding but had failed to do so, as confirmed by the Receiver).
106. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1947; Panel Report, supra note 4, at *122.
107. California had discretion to implement any mechanism it desired to depopulate its
prisons, such as out-of-state transfers, new facilities construction, and other effective means of
compliance. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1941. The Court, however, acknowledged certain programs
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mandating a target population, however, the court made clear that it
would not tolerate more empty promises about remedying the
constitutional violations. 108
C. Majority Upholds Prisoner Release Order
The State of California petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review,
arguing that the Coleman and Plata courts improperly convened threejudge panels, and that the consolidated panel lacked jurisdiction to issue
the prisoner release order, failed to consider the most current prison
conditions, and erred in interpreting PLRA. 109 In a 5-4 decision, the
Brown Court affirmed the three-judge panel’s order. 110 The majority
recognized that judicial action was necessary in light of glaring Eighth
Amendment violations and the observed failure of lengthy, extensive
past remedial efforts. 111
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy highlighted the
constitutional violations stemming from inadequate medical and mental
healthcare in California’s prisons. 112 Kennedy noted that one prison
forced a suicidal inmate to stay in a “telephone-booth sized cage”
without a toilet simply because there was no other space to put him.113
Additionally, nearly 75% of suicides in California’s prisons were
preventable and foreseeable. 114
Delays in medical and mental

and procedures the state could implement, such as expansion of good time credits, diversion of
technical parole violators, and diversion of low-risk offenders to community based programs. Id.
at 1943.
108. See id. at 1941 (finding that the “State ha[d] not proposed any realistic alternative to the
order” and its “desire to avoid a population limit” created “a certain and unacceptable risk of
continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally ill prisoners”).
109. See generally Brief of Appellants, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09-1233).
110. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1947. See generally Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme
Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. REV. 853 (2011) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s
view on prisoners’ rights has changed over the past several decades, and it is unclear how the
Roberts Court will continue to interpret this area of law).
111. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. The Court stated that the “population reduction potentially
required is . . . of unprecedented sweep and extent. Yet so too is the continuing injury and harm
resulting from these serious constitutional violations.” Id.
Although the Court did not explicitly term its assessment of the Eighth Amendment violations
as a core-conditions analysis, the following statement is a strong indication that it was in fact
taking such an approach: “Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if
not provided adequate medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no
place in civilized society.” Id. at 1928. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the
core-conditions approach).
112. Id. at 1924–26.
113. Id. at 1924.
114. Id. at 1924–26. The suicide rate in California’s prisons at the time Brown was decided
was one per week. Id. at 1924. See also CAL. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, CALIFORNIA
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healthcare were frequent; in fact, one officer testified that nearly fifty
sick prisoners were held together in a twelve-by-twenty-foot cage for
several hours as they awaited medical services. 115 Consequently, many
prisoners suffered from severe illnesses and unnecessary pain. 116
The Brown majority also examined PLRA’s requirements and
analyzed whether the district court properly accounted for each of
PLRA’s prongs. 117 The Court first determined that the Plata and
Coleman courts entered orders for less intrusive means, 118 emphasizing
the appointments of the Special Master and Receiver as evidence that
the requirement was met. 119 The Court also rejected the State’s
argument that it received insufficient time to comply with previous
remedial orders, finding that over a decade had passed without
resolution to California’s prison overcrowding crisis and that stateoffered remedies were still ineffectively implemented. 120
Next, the Court determined that overcrowding in California’s prisons
was the primary cause of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. 121
It reasoned that evidence previously presented at trial indicated that
many of the constitutional violations directly resulted from
overcrowding, including understaffing, insufficient clinical space, and
inadequate medical and mental health resources. 122 Manifestations of
these inadequacies included preventable deaths from illness and suicide,
unsanitary clinic conditions, excessive use of segregation, cramped
reception areas, and unsafe living conditions. 123 Even though a prison
population reduction would not entirely eradicate the negative
consequences of overcrowding, the Court recognized that
overpopulation was still a primary cause of the Eighth Amendment

STRATEGIC PLAN ON SUICIDE PREVENTION: EVERY CALIFORNIAN IS PART OF THE SOLUTION 17
(June 2008), available at http://www.dmh.ca.gov/prop_63/MHSA/Prevention_and_Early_
Intervention/docs/SuicidePreventionCommittee/FINAL_CalSPSP_V9.pdf (stating that in 2008,
suicide was the third leading cause of death in California’s prisons).
115. Brown, 131 S. Ct at 1925.
116. Id. at 1925–26.
117. Id. at 1930–44. See infra Part I.C (providing background on PLRA).
118. Brown, 131 S. Ct at 1930–32.
119. Id. at 1931. The Court concluded that less intrusive relief included the appointment of
the Special Master and the Receiver. Id.
120. See id. at 1931 (clarifying that more time to remedy inhumane conditions will not be
allotted if it results in the needless postponement of an effective remedy and the prolonging of
unconstitutional prison conditions).
121. Id. at 1932–37.
122. Id. at 1935. See Panel Report, supra note 4, at *58–99.
123. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1933–35. The Court also noted that some prisons contained
backlogs of approximately 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor. Id. at 1933.
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violations given its inhibiting effect on prison administration. 124
The Court next focused on whether an alternative remedy could
alleviate the constitutional violations, ultimately finding that nothing
short of releasing prisoners would suffice. 125 Although the Court
deemed some State-proposed alternatives reasonable in theory—such as
construction of new facilities and inmate transfers—the Court also
determined that California did not have the financial means to fund
these programs to the extent necessary to remedy overcrowding within
the mandated timeframe. 126 The Court attributed this forecasted
outcome to California’s struggling economic landscape and observed
failures of similar propositions in the past, which, when left unfulfilled,
led to persistent unconstitutional conditions. 127 In sum, the Court
affirmed that a reduction in California’s inmate population was
necessary to improve the prison healthcare system, and clear and
convincing evidence showed that no other remedy would be
effective. 128
Lastly, the Court found that the panel’s prisoner release order was
narrowly drawn and prescribed the least intrusive remedy possible.129
124. Id. at 1936. The Court cited to expert and witness reports as affirmation of the causal
connection between overcrowding and unconstitutional prison conditions. Id. at 1935. For
example, the Court provided testimony from Dr. Craig Haney, a professor of psychology, who
stated that mental health personnel in CDCR facilities were “managing far larger caseloads than
is appropriate or effective.” Id. at 1932. In regards to medical care, the Court referenced Dr.
Ronald Shansky, former medical director of the Illinois prison system, stating that the “demand
for care . . . continues to overwhelm the resources available.” Id. at 1932–33.
125. Id. at 1937–38 (discussing the inadequacy of State-proposed alternatives). See also Brief
of Plata Appellees at 43–44, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09-1233) (noting that
California had ample opportunity to improve its prisons’ medical systems but completely failed to
do so). The Court emphasized that numerous experts had maintained that overcrowding was a
primary cause of the Eighth Amendment violations. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1934.
126. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1937–39. Because California’s jails are also filled to capacity, the
proposed in-state transfers would seemingly redistribute the problem, not solve it. See Panel
Report, supra note 4, at *101 (noting that thirty-two of California’s county jails were under some
type of court-ordered population cap, and others had inmate populations close to or above their
design capacity). See also infra Part IV.B (arguing that transfer processes, referred to as
“realignment,” are not sufficient remedies).
127. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1939. The State urged that other remedial mechanisms, such as new
facilities construction and additional staff, were effective alternatives. Id. at 1937. In considering
the State’s proposal that it could transfer inmates out-of-state, the Court responded:
Even if out-of-state transfers could be regarded as a less restrictive alternative, the
three-judge court found no evidence of plans for transfers in numbers sufficient to
relieve overcrowding. . . . [T]he State has made no effort to show that it has the
resources and the capacity to transfer significantly larger numbers of prisoners . . . .
Id. at 1938.
128. Id. at 1939 (“Without a reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy
for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill in California’s prisons.”).
129. Id. at 1939–44.
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The Court noted that even though the reduction in California’s prison
population would likely take the form of releasing offenders without
mental or medical illness, the order would inevitably lessen the strain on
prison resources. 130 Thus, the population decrease would in turn
directly improve all prisoners’ access to healthcare. 131 The Court
explained that the 137.5% target figure was narrowly drawn based on
expert testimony that purported this number to be effective in
facilitating proper prison administration and alleviating unconstitutional
overcrowding conditions. 132
In responding to the challenge that the release of prisoners would
threaten public safety and was, therefore, an overbroad remedy, the
Court asserted that the State would have discretion to implement
reforms in such a way that would mitigate adverse safety
consequences. 133 Additionally, the Court maintained that, because
overcrowding leads to inmate unrest and higher recidivism,
depopulation would likely have the effect of lowering recidivism rates,
which in turn would substantially offset any negative impact on
civilians resulting from the sizeable release of prisoners. 134 The Court
referred to other states, such as Wisconsin, Illinois, and Montana, that
reduced prison populations—without increasing crime rates or
adversely affecting public safety—through early release programs
targeting low-risk offenders. 135

130. Therefore, the Court determined that even though the order would not have the effect of
releasing members of the plaintiff class, overall access to healthcare would improve as a result of
increased administrative capacity. Id. at 1939–41.
131. See id. (noting the potential for prisoners not involved in the litigation to fall victim to
the failing medical system at some point in the future).
132. Id. at 1942–43. See Brief of Plata Appellees, supra note 125, at 43–44 (noting that the
137.5% figure was reached as a middle ground between evidence that called for a higher cap of
145% and evidence that recommended a design capacity of 130%). The Court made clear,
however, that “[t]here is no requirement that every facility comply with the 137.5% limit.”
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1941. Assuming no constitutional violations occurred, the Court would
allow facilities to retain populations in excess of the limit, provided that other facilities would fall
sufficiently below it so the system as a whole remained in compliance with the 137.5% cap. Id.
133. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1941–44.
134. Id. at 1941–43. The Court found that various available methods of reducing
overcrowding—such as good-time credits allowing the State to administer early release to only
those prisoners who pose the least risk of reoffending, or diversion of low-risk offenders to
community programs and day reporting centers—would have minimal or no impact on public
safety. Id. at 1943.
135. Id. at 1942. This finding was based on the panel’s report, which also discussed how
these early release programs reduced recidivism and were often accompanied by communitybased support services. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *132–33.
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D. Dissenting Opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Alito
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented in Brown,
claiming that the Court affirmed “what is perhaps the most radical
injunction issued by a court in the nation’s history.” 136 Justice Scalia
attacked the majority’s view that the plaintiffs’ allegations rose to the
level of systematic unconstitutionality for which a system-wide remedy
was appropriate. 137 He asserted that only those individuals who were
personally denied adequate healthcare possessed a sufficient basis to
allege Eighth Amendment violations. 138 Because the prisoner release
order would benefit inmates who did not form part of the aggrieved
class, Justice Scalia found that it did not have the narrowly tailored
effect required by PLRA. 139
Justice Scalia also opined that the imposition of such a drastic
measure was well beyond the scope of judicial power. 140 Scalia
contended that the injunctive measures issued by the district court were
more characteristic of executive authority: “[W]hen the injunction
undertakes to restructure a social institution, assessing the factual
consequences of the injunction is necessarily the sort of predictive
136. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia commented that the
majority’s holding was an “outrageous result” and that the Court disregarded “stringently drawn
provisions of the governing statute, and traditional constitutional limitations upon the power of a
federal judge, in order to uphold the absurd.” Id. at 1950–51. See also Brief of Appellants, supra
note 109, at 50 (“Here, the state and local interests are at their zenith: ‘It is difficult to imagine an
activity in which the State has a stronger interest . . . than the administration of its prisons’”
(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973))).
137. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1952 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1951–52. Justice Scalia stated that there are only two instances in which a class of
plaintiffs can assert a claim of systemic unconstitutionally: (1) When the class as a whole suffered
a system-wide constitutional violation; and (2) When every individual class member suffered a
constitutional violation resulting from a poorly run prison. Id. at 1952. Justice Scalia noted that
in Brown, neither of these theories could justify a prisoner release order because the order would
affect individuals who did not experience a constitutional violation. Id. He specifically
contended:
It is . . . worth noting the peculiarity that the vast majority of inmates most generously
rewarded by the release order—the 46,000 whose incarceration will be ended—do not
form part of any aggrieved class even under the Court’s expansive notion of
constitutional violation. Most of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions or
severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have
developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.
Id. at 1952–53.
139. Id. at 1952. See also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (holding that a
plaintiff seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must “assert the violation of a federal right, not
merely a violation of federal law”).
140. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1954 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When a Judge manages a
structural injunction, however, he will inevitably be required to make very broad empirical
predictions necessarily based in large part upon policy view—the sort of predictions regularly
made by legislators and executive officials, but inappropriate for the Third Branch.”).
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judgment that our system of government allocates to other government
officials.” 141
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote a separate
dissenting opinion in which he suggested that the data the Receiver and
Special Master collected was outdated. 142 He urged that overcrowding
was not as dire as it had been when the data was collected.143
Furthermore, Justice Alito stated that the recent decrease in California’s
violent crime directly corresponded to increased incarceration, and that
these statistics supported his view that a prisoner release order was
inherently dangerous for society. 144 Justice Alito concluded by
expressing concern for the safety of California’s residents: “I fear that
today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim
roster of victims. I hope that I am wrong. In a few years, we will
see.” 145
III. ANALYSIS
In assessing the Brown Court’s decision, it is vital to consider the
California Legislature’s contributing role in the State’s prison
overcrowding crisis. The Legislature’s failure to effectively respond to
prison overcrowding led to persistent and severe constitutional
violations, which ultimately created a situation that required judicial
intervention. Similarly, the Court’s analysis and application of PLRA in
Brown was crucial to prevent prisoner release orders from becoming
unattainable in situations where overcrowding causes Eighth
Amendment violations. While the Court-imposed prisoner release order
was a necessary step after more than a decade of litigation, it was also
one of last resort. California was, and still is, faced with the challenge
of digging itself out of an administrative mess due to its use of reactive
measures to correct the shortcomings of its corrections system.
141. Id. at 1954–55.
142. Id. at 1960–62 (Alito, J., dissenting).
143. Id. Justice Alito stated that, in order to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation,
plaintiffs must show continuous and current constitutional violations. Id. at 1962. Justice Alito
noted that the evidence used by the Supreme Court and the lower court to justify its findings
occurred several years prior to the Brown Court’s decision. Id. at 1961–62.
144. Id. at 1966–67. Justice Alito stated that the decrease in violent crime was due at least in
part to longer prison sentences, and releasing prisoners would likely have an opposite effect. Id.
But see generally Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect
of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551 (2009) (asserting that longer prison sentences
unlikely correlate to decreases in violent crime, where the adverse effects of longer, harsher
sentences include: (1) the imposition of substantial costs on society; (2) the creation of social
stigmas faced by released prisoners; and (3) increased risk of infectious diseases to incarcerated
individuals).
145. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1968 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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This Part analyzes the Court’s holding in Brown. First, this Part
discusses the Legislature’s failure to respond to the prison overcrowding
crisis and why judicial intervention was necessary. This Part then
addresses the Court’s determination that overcrowding was a primary
causal factor of the Eighth Amendment violations. Next, this Part
discusses the Brown Court’s application of PLRA in finding that a
prisoner release order was necessary to remedy the Eighth Amendment
violations that persisted for decades due in part to legislative inaction.
Lastly, this Part addresses the public and dissenting Justices’ concerns
regarding Brown’s order to release convicted criminals, why this view is
misplaced, and why prolonged incarceration may not be the most
effective solution for reducing crime.
A. The Severe Constitutional Violations Necessitated
Judicial Intervention
After nearly twelve years—a reasonable, if not ample amount of time
to complete remedial efforts—unconstitutional confinement conditions
in CDCR facilities persisted. 146 California’s legislative branch failed to
remedy the longstanding violations even after the appointments of the
Special Master and Receiver. 147 For example, California claimed it
could, and would, construct enough new prison facilities to remedy
overcrowding. After over a decade, however, the State had yet to
advance construction plans, or expand existing infrastructure, to the
degree to which it pledged. 148
146. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Coleman court’s finding
that over a decade had passed, and still the unconstitutional conditions persisted). The State
argued that the clock measuring “reasonable time to comply” should restart with each new
remedial order. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 109, at 22–24. This reasoning is illogical
seeing that the remedial process could continue indefinitely. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1938–39
(rebutting the State’s argument that continued efforts by the Receiver and Special Master would
be successful, and finding that “[n]othing in the long history of the Coleman and Plata actions
demonstrates any real possibility” that resources would be made available to support Stateproposed alternatives to the prisoner release order).
147. See infra Part II.A (discussing the lower courts’ findings that necessary improvements in
prison administration were not made, the remedial efforts were still seriously lacking, and a
prisoner release order was necessary). The State urged that other remedial mechanisms, such as
constructing additional prisoner facilities, inmate transfers, and hiring additional staff, were
effective alternatives. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1937. Even the Special Master and Receiver
indicated that any advances that had been, or would be made, were quickly quashed by significant
increases in the prison system’s population. Id. at 1931–32.
148. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1938 (“Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate
overcrowding, but the three-judge court found no realistic possibility that California would be
able to build itself out of this crisis.”). Further, in considering the State’s proposal that it could
transfer inmates to out-of-state prisons, the Court responded: “Even if out-of-state transfers could
be regarded as a less restrictive alternative, the three-judge court found no evidence of plans for
transfers in numbers sufficient to relieve overcrowding . . . .” Id.
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Furthermore, harsh sentencing and correctional policies remain intact
today, and public support for them continues unabated. 149 This trend
reflects the traditional two-fold hurdle legislators face in enacting
corrections reforms. First, due to the public’s “tough on crime”
mentality, any legislator openly in favor of shorter sentencing will likely
face public backlash. 150 Second, given state budget deficits, the public
will be apprehensive of any political officer who endorses increased
corrections spending, even if it is geared toward effective rehabilitation
programs or improving harsh prison conditions. 151 Because the
California Legislature was not sufficiently responding to the prison
overcrowding crisis, judicial intervention in Brown was necessary. 152
The Court’s willingness to uphold the order was also consistent with its
increased hands-on approach to Eighth Amendment challenges in the
prison context.
1. Primary Causal Factor
California’s sentencing and correctional policies, when combined
with a dwindling state budget and an inability to expand or improve
facilities, significantly contributed to overcrowding in its prisons. 153 In

149. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (suggesting that public opinion pushing
for “tough on crime” tactics sustains high prison populations).
150. Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2009, at A13.
151. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that taxpayers want their money spent
on other budget items instead of corrections). But see Randal C. Archibold, Driven to the
Financial Brink, A State Opens the Prison Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A14 (“[T]he
prison population [is] a major drag on the state’s crippled finances . . . . [Eleven] percent of the
state budget, or roughly $8 billion, goes to the penal system, putting it ahead of expenditures like
higher education . . . .”). Public perspective on correctional reform is ironic given that certain
reforms, such as shorter sentencing combined with an emphasis on rehabilitation, result in an
overall decrease in spending and have proven more effective. See infra notes 198, 203, 262 and
accompanying text (noting that these methods are more effective and save states between $20,000
and $30,000 annually per offender).
152. See Michael B. Farrell, Schwarzenegger: Riot ‘Terrible Symptom’ of Crowded Prisons,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/0819/
schwarzenegger-riot-terrible-symptom-of-crowded-prisons (stating that despite pressure from
courts, prisoner rights advocates, and former Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposals to scale back
prison populations, such reforms have been unwelcomingly received by Republican “allies” in the
California Legislature). It is important to recognize that California urged the Court to consider
recent reductions it had made in prison populations since the Court granted certiorari. Brief of
Appellants, supra note 109, at 42. However, the plaintiffs emphasized the lower court’s finding
that waiting longer before convening the panel “would serve no purpose.” Brief of Plata
Appellees, supra note 125, at 33.
153. See Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California’s Budget Crisis, TIME (July 27, 2009), http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985,00.html (noting California’s severe budget
deficit of over $25 billion). A primary budgetary pressure is the increasing costs associated with
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), CDCR officials’ union. CDCR
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turn, overcrowding led to inhumane prison conditions and increased
inmate pain, death, and suicide rates—the severity of which was clearly
articulated in Brown. 154
The Court, while recognizing that a reduction in the prison
population would not alone solve the problems exposed in Brown,
reasoned that the overall effect of a reduction would rectify Eighth
Amendment violations in California’s prisons. 155 It cited substantial
evidence from experts stating that overcrowding directly resulted in
insufficient staffing levels, inadequate screening and assessment
techniques, unsanitary conditions, and several other factors that
contributed to a reduction in prisoners’ mental and medical wellbeing. 156 Indeed, these experts, including the Special Master and
Receiver, testified that overcrowding was the problem. 157 In fact, even
the State recognized overcrowding as a causal factor in Brown—a fact
further evidenced by Governor Schwarzenegger’s public statements
regarding the overcrowding epidemic in California’s prisons. 158
The Court correctly found that reducing prison populations would

is one of largest civil employers due to the significant rise in inmate populations. See Petersilia,
supra note 22, at 224; CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, PROFESSORS AND PRISON GUARDS: AN
OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S STATE WORKFORCE 1 (Apr. 2010) (finding that in 2010, CDCR
grew four times the rate of other state employers). As of 2006, a correctional officer in California
earned on average $73,248 per year. Petersilia, supra note 22, at 225.
154. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924–25 (noting that the suicide rate was approximately one per
week, suicidal inmates were held in telephone-booth sized cages for extended periods of time due
to a shortage of treatment beds, and 72.1% of suicides were “most probably foreseeable and/or
preventable”).
155. See infra Part II.C (detailing the Court’s application of PLRA’s primary cause
requirement).
156. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1932–34. The Court noted evidence that overcrowding leads to
staff shortages and delays in medical and mental healthcare, creates unsafe and unsanitary living
conditions, and causes the spread of infectious disease. Id. The opinion also quoted the former
Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, who stated: “Everything
revolves around overcrowding” and “overcrowding is the primary cause of the medical and
mental health care violations.” Id. at 1934. See also Haney, supra note 39, at 266 (“[T]he most
important factor that helps to explain the current crisis in American corrections—a crisis that
includes a lack of effective programming and treatment, the persistence of dangerous and
deprived conditions of confinement, and the widespread use of forceful, extreme, and potentially
damaging techniques of institutional control (such as those used in supermax facilities)—is the
overcrowding that has plagued our state and federal prison systems for most of the last thirty
years.” (footnote omitted)).
157. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *58–60. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the lower
court’s consideration of the Special Master and Receiver’s findings).
158. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (providing a statement from Governor
Schwarzenegger’s proclamation on prison overcrowding). See also Mark Martin, Prisons in
Crisis, Governor Declares, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Governor
Schwarzenegger “declared California’s prison system dangerously overcrowded” and ordered a
special legislative session to enact proposals to remedy the situation).
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have an overall positive impact on the availability and delivery of
healthcare services, which in turn would address CDCR’s systematic
Eighth Amendment violations. 159 Reducing the prison population
would decrease the number of inmates in need of care and consequently
place less strain on CDCR’s thinly distributed resources. 160 This
depopulation would ultimately have the effect of improving access to
healthcare. 161 The reduction would also make facilities less chaotic,
thereby facilitating prison officials’ ability to maintain order, enhance
security, and remove roadblocks to timely treatment. 162 The overall
improvement in prison management would ultimately increase retention
of competent staff and reduce medical personnel vacancies. 163
2. Prisoner Release Orders Are Not Unattainable under PLRA
One of the Court’s crucial responsibilities is to ensure that
constitutional violations of any nature do not continue unaddressed.164
Even Congress cannot place limits on this supervisory role—a role that
supersedes a state’s claim of administrative authority. 165 In looking at
the State’s objections, as well as the public safety concerns surrounding
Brown’s order, it is vital to keep in mind that these matters were
balanced against fundamental constitutional rights. PLRA allows the
judicial branch to become involved when legislative measures
consistently prove ineffective. 166 If Congress intended to eliminate
prison population caps altogether, it would have likely indicated this
sentiment through more definitive statutory language. 167
159. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s finding that a reduction in overcrowding
would systematically improve facility conditions).
160. See supra Part II.C.
161. See supra Part II.C.
162. See infra Part III.B (discussing systematic strains that resulted from prison
overcrowding).
163. See infra Part III.B (discussing the panel’s finding that a reduction in overcrowding
would systematically improve conditions of confinement).
164. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s departure from its “hands-off” approach with
respect to Eighth Amendment claims).
165. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928–29 (2011) (“Courts may not allow
constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the
realm of prison administration.”). Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (finding that
significant constitutional questions would arise where a federal statute was construed to “deny
any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”).
166. See supra Part I.C (discussing PLRA’s provisions). See also Sercye, supra note 25, at
481 (“Federal courts have long recognized that [prison] population reduction orders may
sometimes be necessary to ensure constitutional prison conditions.”).
167. In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, the Court asserted: “We have stated time and
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there.” 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (2006)
(indicating no use of the term “only”). “Where Congress includes particular language in one
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While the Brown dissenting opinions criticized the use of a systemwide remedy, the Court has generally recognized that such remedies are
appropriate where enough instances of actual or imminent harm are
apparent due to an overall deficient system. 168 For example, in
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, the Court found a system-wide
remedy appropriate where a school board’s unconstitutional
desegregation plan had a significant widespread segregative impact.169
Moreover, the Court in Helling v. McKinney noted that even the
possibility of future constitutional violations in a prison context
provides a basis for system-wide relief. 170
The Brown Court, in assessing whether the prisoner release order was
narrowly tailored under PLRA’s framework, properly emphasized that
the focus should not be placed on whether every inmate suffered a
constitutional violation, but instead on whether a court’s authority
allows for system-wide injunctive relief. 171 In this instance, the Court
affirmed its authority to take action where serious adverse consequences
threaten the entire inmate population. 172 Additionally, in addressing
PLRA in the context of a prison population cap, which in this instance
was unmatched in scale, the Court’s statutory interpretation set
necessary precedent enabling courts to take extensive remedial action in
situations where the legislature is unsuccessful or unresponsive. 173

section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Gozlon-Peretz
v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404–05 (1991) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983)).
168. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348–49 (1996) (recognizing that inmates who can
provide enough instances of actual or imminent injury can establish a claim that requires a
system-wide remedy). Cf. Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 F.3d 637, 646 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n
the conditions-of-confinement challenge of the case before us, [Plaintiff] and all the inmates
living in the same room are similarly subjected to the same unconstitutional condition, and no
individual remedy will be adequate unless it eliminates the unconstitutional condition in the
barracks as a whole, which necessarily benefits all the inmates residing there.”).
169. 443 U.S. 449, 465–68 (1979).
170. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“That the Eighth Amendment protects
against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition.”). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (stating that it is “cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions”).
171. See Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, supra note 56, at 964 (asserting that the
subjective component of the Eighth Amendment framework does not require a prisoner seeking a
remedy for unsafe conditions to await a tragic event before obtaining relief). See also Sercye,
supra note 25, at 477 (describing this approach as the “need-narrow-intrusiveness” standard,
which is “best understood as being composed of two elements: scope of relief and form of
relief”).
172. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011).
173. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (highlighting the deference given to the
State in complying with the prisoner release order).
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Although Congress intended for PLRA to curtail frivolous prisoner
suits, this statute does not proscribe inmates from bringing claims all
together (surely such a law would be unconstitutional). 174 On the one
hand, the Court had not previously analyzed PLRA’s prison population
cap requirements before Brown, and thus, it was unclear how liberally
the Court would issue a population cap. On the other hand, if Brown,
which addressed the most severely overcrowded prison system in the
U.S., did not present a factual pattern that triggered a population cap
under PLRA, such a context may not exist. 175 As the Court noted: “The
medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls
below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.
This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy,
and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in
overcrowding.” 176 Not only was judicial intervention necessary, but the
system-wide remedy was urgent to prevent serious bodily harm and
death.
B. Discretion Given to the State
Although the State, as well as Justice Alito in dissent, urged that the
court order constituted unnecessary judicial interference in corrections
administration—an area Alito stressed is better left to state control177—
the order provided “ample flexibility” for California to repair its
overpopulated prison system. 178 The Brown Court gave California
seemingly free rein to administer remedies it deemed most effective and
to tailor these remedies specifically to each CDCR facility. 179 In the
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that California had the
option to build more prisons, hire additional staff, or transfer its inmates

174. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1998) (“PLRA narrowly limits the relief
a federal court may order in prisoner suits.”), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1158 (1999). See also Brief
Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 6, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011) (No. 09-1233) [hereinafter Amici Curiae ACLU]. The legislative intent behind PLRA was
not to make release orders unattainable in cases where ongoing and undisputed constitutional
violations existed, but to address the problem of population caps being imposed in the absence of
any finding of a constitutional violation. Id.
175. See Shay & Kalb, supra note 48, at 319–21 (explaining that some view PLRA as
effectively allowing abuses in U.S. prisons and jails to persist, which unjustly inhibits prisoners’
access to courts).
176. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1947.
177. See infra Part II.D. See also Brief of Appellants, supra note 109, at 53 (asserting that the
order denied the State of “meaningful discretion to manage particular facilities”).
178. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (explaining the discretion given to the
State in complying with the prisoner release order).
179. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1939–41. The State is free to develop response mechanisms that
reflect cost-effective goals, so long as they are constitutional. Id.
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to out-of-state prisons, private facilities, or county jails. 180 Although
Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, and the State consistently referred to the
order as a “prisoner release order,” it was in essence an order to reduce
the prison population in the form of a population cap, and the State had
discretion to ultimately reach compliance without releasing a single
inmate. 181 In Castillo v. Cameron County, for instance, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the state of Texas could divert low-risk offenders
instead of releasing inmates to relieve overcrowding and comply with
its court-mandated cap. 182 The fact that, prior to the court-mandated
order, California did not divert low-risk offenders, build more prisons,
expand existing prisons, or implement other mechanisms that it claimed
would resolve the issue of overcrowding during the first two years postBrown solidifies the Supreme Court’s contention that the legislature was
consistently making empty promises. 183
C. Public Safety Concerns
A primary reason for the State and dissenting opinions’ opposition to
judicial interference, and one from which public concern stemmed, was
the order’s implications on public safety. 184 As evidence of state and
public outcry, former GOP state senator George Runner stated:

180. Id. Due to fiscal turmoil, California was not in the financial state to realistically
complete these options. Id. at 1939.
181. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) (2006) (defining a “prisoner release order” as a
“temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of
reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or nonadmission of
prisoners to a prison”).
182. 238 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2001).
183. See One Year in, Is California’s Plan to Fix Its Prisons Working?, THE CAL. REP. (Aug.
22, 2012), http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201208220850/a (“CDCR has not had a
history of being able to really marshal the kind of effort that [remedying overcrowding] is going
to take . . . .” (quotations omitted)). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing California’s efforts to
remedy overcrowding through realignment mechanisms).
184. See infra Part II.D (detailing the dissenting opinions). See also Bill Otis, Take the Kids
Inside and Lock the Door, CRIMEANDCONSEQUENCES.COM (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.crime
andconsequences.com/crimblog/2011/10/take-the-kids-inside-and-lock-.html (“Plata’s legalized
jailbreak has begun.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Show, Don’t Tell: Do Photographs of California’s
Overcrowded Prisons Belong in a Supreme Court Decision about Those Prisons?, SLATE (May
23, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/show_dont_
tell.html (questioning the Court’s use of photographs to incite public empathy); Bill Mears, High
Court Orders Drastic Prison Population Reduction in California, CNN (May 24, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/05/23/scotus.california.prisons (referring to Brown’s ruling as
reflecting the “classic battle over state versus federal authority” and “focusing on whether U.S.
courts can step in and essentially run state prisons when officials have repeatedly violated basic
constitutional guarantees afforded to inmates”); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut
Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at A1 (calling the Court’s decision as one that
“broke along ideological lines”).
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“By flooding our neighborhoods with criminals, the court will make
one of the highest taxed states in the nation among the most dangerous
as well . . . .” “At a time when law-abiding Californians cannot find
jobs, it’s hard to imagine how convicted felons will do anything other
than return to a life of crime.” 185

Despite the fact that the three-judge panel heard 10 days of trial,
considered over 100 exhibits, and dedicated 50 pages of its opinion to
the issue of public safety, concern surrounding convicted inmates’
potential return to society persisted. 186 The three-judge panel, however,
found that California could safely implement a population reduction
through effective and reliable methods. 187 As the panel noted, the
State’s options included: “[E]nhancing good time and program
participation credits; diverting technical parole violators and certain
offenders with short sentences; reducing the length of
parole supervision; implementing evidence-based rehabilitative
programming; or implementing sentencing reforms . . . .”
The panel based its public safety findings on numerous expert
testimonies and empirical evidence from other states. 188 For instance,
in considering the effectiveness of early release programs, the panel
looked to an expert report that evaluated similar programs in Canada, as
well as Washington, Wisconsin, and Colorado (among other U.S.
states), over the past twenty years and found that such programs do not
endanger public safety. 189 Additionally, the panel noted that Texas
recently reduced its prison population by diverting technical parole
185. Patrick McGreevy & Anthony York, California Scrambles after Supreme Court Orders
the Release of Thousands of Inmates, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2001), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/california-politics/2011/05/state-scrambles-to-deal-with-prison-order.html.
186. See infra Part II.D (noting Justice Scalia and Justice Alito’s concerns regarding public
safety). See also supra note 187 (exemplifying public outcry against the order).
187. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *123. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s finding
that the prisoner release order could be safely implemented). The three-judge panel stated: “[W]e
conclude that shortening an inmate’s length of stay in prison would not increase recidivism rates,
and that shortening the length of stay through earned credits would give inmates incentives to
participate in programming designed to lower recidivism.” Panel Report, supra note 4, at *145.
The Court considered statistics indicating that between 1996 and 2006, California had conducted
small-scale early release programs in certain counties that did not result in higher crime rates.
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1920 (2011). Evidence also shows that in Los Angeles County,
a decline in the crime rate followed the release of 56,000 inmates in compliance with a mandatory
population cap. CAL. STATE SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, JAIL OVERCROWDING: A STATE AND LOCAL
CRISIS (2006), available at http://www.calsheriffs.org/index.php/resource-center/cssa-library/jailovercrowding-whitepaper; Overall Violent Crime Down 13%—Overall Crime Declines in LASD
Area, L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://sheriff.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/lasd/media/detail/
?current=true&urile=wcm:path:/lasd+content/lasd+site/home/home+top+stories/overall+violent+
crime+down+13++overall+crime+declines+in+lasd+area (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
188. Panel Report, supra note 4, at *123.
189. Id. at *175.
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violators and using risk-based guidelines to increase the state’s parole
grant rate without adverse public safety consequences. 190 Furthermore,
as discussed in Part IV, diversion and post-release supervision as
alternatives to prison are often more effective than incarceration. 191
Moreover, these alternatives are cheaper than imprisonment and thereby
preserve resources that states can dedicate to rehabilitation. Because
housing an inmate is the most expensive corrections option—
approximately $78.95 per day—states are spending more than twenty
times what the daily cost of probation would be per offender. 192
1. Incarceration and Recidivism: The Real Consequences
Brown’s holding should serve as a direct challenge to the
effectiveness of the nation’s current incarceration regime. The
following passage poses key questions for legislatures and constituents
in the post-Brown era:
“[I]f ‘prison works’ is the answer, what was the question?” If the
question is whether it is possible to prevent individuals from
committing crimes by putting them in prison, then prison certainly
works . . . . But if the question is what is the best way to reduce crime,
“prison works” may not be the most helpful response. Does a fiveyear prison sentence work better to reduce crime than a two-year
prison sentence? . . .
The most salient question of all may be, Do the resources devoted
to prison “work” better to ensure public safety than if those resources
were devoted to something else? Prisons are not the only way to fight
crime. 193

Unquestionably, incarceration prevents individuals from re-offending
while imprisoned 194 and arguably deters unlawful conduct. 195 It also
190. Id. at *166–67.
191. See infra notes 198, 262 and accompanying text (comparing the cost of incarceration and
alternative mechanisms). See generally THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, POLICY FRAMEWORK TO
STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 7 (2008), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_correction/P
olicyFramework.pdf (finding that the assessment of offender risk associated with good-time
credit programs helps to improve prisoner assignments and supervision, and enables staff to better
design and tailor rehabilitative programs, which are two key components to reducing recidivism).
192. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 6.
193. DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 16 (2007) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
194. See Doug Keller, Rethinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 98
(2012) (“Nevertheless, a sentencing scheme designed to prevent individuals from committing
crimes by locking them up for longer periods is bound to be successful in the limited sense in
which all incapacitation schemes are successful. As noted criminologist David Patton explained,
‘Inmates cannot commit crimes outside of prison while in prison.’” (footnote omitted)).
195. See id. at 76–77 (discussing the general deterrence theory). For an overview of the
deterrence theories and criminal law, see sources cited in id. at 76 n.39.
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addresses public sentiment that few costs are too great to protect another
individual from falling victim to crime, as well as the belief that those
who commit crimes deserve to be punished. 196 However, the more
significant inquiry surrounding the effectiveness of “tough on crime”
policies is whether incarceration is as effective as other alternatives.197
Programs that divert individuals from prison and that focus on
rehabilitation may be more cost-efficient and more effective at reducing
overall crime rates over the long term. 198 By focusing solely on
whether and for how long an individual is incarcerated, the “tough on
crime” mentality inhibits consideration of additional important factors,
including: (1) why the crime was committed in the first place; and (2)
how society can prevent first-time and repeat offenses. 199
While the pain and hardship of incarceration can have a deterrent
effect on an individual contemplating crime, incarceration can also
socialize convicted persons into further criminal activity. 200 The
environment created by severely overcrowded prisons cultivates
violence, perpetuates criminal habits, and can lead individuals to reoffend once released. In short, prison can foster a “criminogenic”
atmosphere. 201 The current functioning of the prison system also
196. Unfortunately, the cost-benefit analysis of release versus incarceration is not a
“conversation society is having.” W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 395, 403 (2011). As Ball notes,
We tend to discuss the crime level as something that should, optimally, be zero . . . .
Public safety is not an optional budget item . . . . Each crime committed by a parolee
[or an offender released early] is seen as both avoidable and worth avoiding. . . . The
problem with this line of thinking is that it avoids the costs of nonrelease—the
financial and human costs of incarceration—and fails to account for the marginal
crime-reduction benefits in sufficient detail.
Id. at 403–04 (emphasis added).
197. See Keller, supra note 194, at 76 (“Criminologists have [long] chronicled the struggle of
criminal law to deter conduct.”).
198. Compare the cost of housing a prisoner, which (according to a poll of thirty-three states
in 2009) is approximately $29,000, to the cost of supervising an offender in the community
through parole and probations, which ranges from $1,250 to $2,750 annually. PEW CTR. ON THE
STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 12 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_326-09.pdf. Therefore, the cost to house and manage inmates is twenty-two times more per day
compared to supervising offenders in the community. Id.
199. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION:
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION (2012) (evaluating the deterrence component of
criminal punishment and how it relates to crime prevention).
200. See Dan Harris, Prison Violence Can Heighten Public Danger, ABC NEWS (June 7,
2006), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/LegalCenter/story?id=2048040&page=1 (analogizing the
release of inmates from the current prison system to putting a pit bull in a cage, poking him with a
stick, and subsequently letting him out in a classroom of students).
201. See Fan, supra note 43, at 595 (“[P]risons may exert a criminogenic effect, brutalizing
the inmate further, facilitating the creation of a criminal network, providing an education in
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results in many instances of violence among incarcerated individuals—
the inhumane, crowded, and understaffed prisons lead to unattended
fights, suicide, and gang reprisals. 202 Hence, keeping certain offenders
out of prison, shortening unnecessarily lengthy sentences, and
emphasizing the development of rehabilitation programs can ultimately
improve public safety. 203
Evidence further suggests that increasing incarceration does not
correspond to an equal improvement in public safety. States that have
relatively high incarceration rates do not always have corresponding
lower recidivism and crime rates. 204 For example, both New York and
Florida had prison populations of approximately 70,000 inmates in the
early 2000s. 205 Over the ensuing decade, Florida’s inmate population
increased by 30,000 individuals whereas New York’s fell by 10,000.206
Despite their diverging paths, both states experienced a similar drop in
crime—in fact, New York’s drop was larger. 207 As a possible
explanation, experts have recognized that excessive imprisonment of
offenders, which results in lacking or nonexistent rehabilitation
programs, can have the unintended effect of perpetuating offenders’

criminality, and consolidating a criminal identity.”).
202. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1054–55
(stating that prisons are essentially “schools for criminals,” as inmates interact with other
criminals and internalize the antisocial norms promulgated by the correctional facilities).
203. See infra Part IV.C (detailing proactive reform approaches to corrections and
incarceration). See also Nancy Vogel, Rehab in Prisons Can Cut Costs, Report Says, L.A. TIMES,
June 30, 2007, at B1 (noting that if prisons effectively rehabilitated their inmates and capitalized
on safe early release methods, the State could save between $561 million and $684 million a year
on a reduced inmate population).
204. See JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DIMINISHING
RETURNS: CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE 1990S, at 3 (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_diminishingreturns.pdf (explaining the
diminishing marginal benefit of increased incarceration rates past a certain point).
205. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 5.
206. Id.
207. Id. Some scholars attribute New York’s crime rate drop to New York City’s “Broken
Windows” approach to crime fighting and its aggressive policing. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell,
Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance
Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276 (2009). The Broken Windows theory
maintains that “physical and social disorder (broken windows in houses or factories, abandoned
lots, begging, loitering, and public drinking or urination) give rise to fear, which leads inhabitants
to stay at home and sends a signal to more serious criminals that no one cares about a block or
neighborhood,” which thereby increases crime. Id. New York City’s “Zero Tolerance Policing,”
which emphasizes the prevention of petty offenses with the hope of deterring more serious ones,
puts offenders behind bars for longer stretches of time. Id. at 276. Nevertheless, while New York
has experienced a significant drop in crime since implementing the zero tolerance approach, the
evidence is unclear as to how weighty its impact has been on the declining crime rate. Id. at 277–
78.
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criminal habits upon release. 208 California is a prime example: between
2004 and 2007, the rate of recidivism among California’s inmates was
57.8%. 209 Compared to three year recidivism rates in other states
during the same time period—for example, 31.9% in Texas, 34.8% in
Georgia, and 39.1% in Arizona—California’s high return-to-prison
percentage is striking. 210
IV. IMPACT
Almost two years after the Supreme Court decided Brown, and as the
prisoner release order’s final benchmark draws near, California is still
attempting to reduce its prison population to meet its Court-mandated
cap. In 2011, the State instituted a series of programs intended to lower
prison populations, including transferring low-risk offenders to county
facilities. 211 These methods, however, are reactive and fail to address
the underlying issue at hand: how California and other states can
prevent prison populations from reaching crisis points again in the
future. 212 Whether California’s ongoing efforts will succeed at the time
of its two-year benchmark remains to be seen. Additionally, whether
states will learn from this administrative debacle and instigate proactive
reforms to prevent overcrowding and unconstitutional conditions before
they occur is an issue of even greater concern. 213
This Part first enumerates the steps California has taken in its effort
to comply with Brown’s prisoner release order. This Part then assesses
the measured success of these efforts and suggests that reactive
measures may not effectively serve as long-term solutions to prison
overcrowding. In tandem, this Part discusses proactive measures,
including actions taken in Illinois, and addresses why these methods
more successfully rehabilitate inmates and thereby reduce recidivism.
Finally, this Part notes that as Brown’s two-year benchmark approaches,
state legislatures should reconsider the cost-effectiveness and social
208. Amici Curiae ACLU, supra note 174, at 23. For example, between 2008 and 2009, West
Virginia’s incarceration rate increased by 5.1%, while its crime rate rose simultaneously by 8.3%.
Id. at 18–19. See generally HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 1–2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p09.pdf (providing a statistical analysis of inmate population fluxes between 2008 and
2009).
209. PEW CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 13, at 9–10.
210. Id. at 9–11.
211. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (June 15,
2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/About_CDCR/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf
(providing an in-depth description of the bills that have been passed regarding realignment and
their intended purposes).
212. See infra Part IV.A–B.
213. See supra Part IV.C (describing front-end and back-end reforms).
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desirability of incarceration. In that regard, Brown may ultimately quiet
proponents of “tough on crime” policies. 214
A. Realignment: An Assessment of California’s Current Response
California’s response to Brown’s order took shape through its Public
Safety Realignment Plan (“Realignment Plan”). 215 The basic goal of
the Realignment Plan is to increase the role of county jails in
incarceration and post-release supervision in order to effectively “close
the revolving door to low-level inmates cycling in and out of state
prisons.” 216 More specifically, the Realignment Plan aimed to reduce
the inmate population to 155% of the prison system’s design capacity
by June 27, 2012. 217 In order to effectuate this change, the State, in
tandem with CDCR, committed to providing additional funding and
resources required to house inmates in county jails. 218 This realignment
strategy began after Governor Brown signed AB 109 and AB 117 into
law on October 1, 2011. 219 Additionally, California voters approved
Proposition 30 in November 2012, which created permanent funding to
counties cooperating with the Realignment Plan. 220

214. See Senator Jim Webb, Why We Must Fix Our Prisons, PARADE (Mar. 29, 2009), http://
www.parade.com/news/2009/03/why-we-must-fix-our-prisons.html (finding that fixing prisons
will require a “major nationwide recalculation of who goes to prison and for how long”). See
also Klingele, supra note 21, at 469 (noting that with severe budgetary impediments,
governments are starting to recognize that increasing prison populations are causing fiscal strain).
215. AB 109 & AB 117: Public Safety Realignment of 2011, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/AB_109-PowerPoint-Overview.pdf (last visited Jan.
26, 2013) [hereinafter AB 109 & AB 117].
216. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE 5 (2011),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter
CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE]. California’s acknowledgement of the “revolving door”
ailment was reflected in Governor Brown’s statement:
For too long, the state’s prison system has been a revolving door for lower-level
offenders and parole violators who are released within months—often before they are
even transferred out of a reception center. Cycling these offenders through state
prisons wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation, and
impedes local law enforcement supervision.
Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., AB 109 Signing Message (April 5, 2011),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_109_Signing_Message.pdf.
217. CORRECTIONS, YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 216, at 5.
218. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2012-13 BUDGET: THE 2011 REALIGNMENT
OF ADULT OFFENDERS—AN UPDATE (Feb. 22, 2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/
analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adult-offenders-022212.aspx (discussing budget
allocation for realignment purposes).
219. See A.B. 109, 2011–12 Reg. Sess., ch. 15 (Cal. 2011); A.B. 117, 2011–12 Reg. Sess., ch.
39 (Cal. 2011); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., FACT SHEET: ACTIONS CDCR HAS TAKEN TO
REDUCE OVERCROWDING (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/FSActions-ReduceInmatePop.pdf.
220. The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and
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The Realignment Plan does not provide for inmate transfer in any
capacity. 221 Rather, as of October 1, 2011, non-violent and non-sex
offenders are now diverted to the county system upon conviction to free
up state prison space for all other convicted felons. 222 In addition to
serving time in county facilities, low-level offenders also receive parole
supervision from county officials and participate in various county
community programs upon release. 223
The short-term effects of California’s realignment strategy reflect
some progress. 224 Within two months of AB 109 and AB 117’s
implementation, California’s prison population decreased by 7000
inmates. 225 Within six months, the total decrease in California’s state
prison population reached 11,000. 226 Due to this visible progress, in
January 2012, district court Judge Henderson noted the approaching end
of California’s court-appointed Receivership. 227 As of October 2012,
California still has to release approximately 3000 inmates to meet its
court-ordered prison capacity. 228
In addition to the short-term successes of the Realignment Plan, the
promised long-term goals of AB 109 and AB 117 are lofty. Most
notably, AB 109 promises to save California an estimated $458 million
in correction expenses and allow the State to reach complete compliance
with the prisoner release order within the mandated two-year time
frame. 229 In an October 2012 report, CDCR claimed that its
Recidivism, CDCR, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
221. AB 109 & AB 117, supra note 215, at 11.
222. It is notable that there are exceptions to this model. For example, bribing a legislator
constitutes an offense that mandates that the sentence be served in prison. Id. at 9.
223. Id. at 12–14.
224. CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 216, at 5–9.
225. Id. at 6.
226. Our View: Signs of Progress in State Prisons, CAL. CORR. PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N,
http://www.ccpoa.org/2012/01/our-view-signs-of-progress-in-state-prisons/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2013).
227. However, the ending of the Receivership will likely be a process that occurs over years,
rather than months, as federal court supervision cautiously recedes. See Chris Megerian, U.S.
Supervision of Inmate Care Retained, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A5 (noting the district court’s
rejection of the state’s request to end the Receivership in the next six months, and that it will
require more improvement before dissolving the Receivership); Officials Seek End to Oversight
of Prison Health Care in 30 Days, CALIFORNIAHEALTHLINE.ORG (May 9, 2012),
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2012/5/9/officials-seek-end-to-oversight-of-prisonhealth-care-in-30-days.aspx (stating that the Receiver, J. Clark Kelso, believes that federal
oversight should continue for another year and a half).
228. Weekly Population Figures, CDCR.CA.GOV, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2012).
229. Ryan Gabrielson, AB 109: County Officials Scrambling to Make Room for New Inmates,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/ab-109-countyofficials-s_n_845579.html.
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realignment policy would continue to save California an additional $1.5
billion through reduced spending that accompanies declining offender
populations. 230 Further, according to CDCR, “[n]o longer needing to
construct and operate many new facilities [will allow] the state [to]
realize over $3 billion in General Fund savings annually.” 231
Despite its early successes, California’s Realignment Plan has
engendered notable costs. 232 To begin, very few county facilities have
any unused space. 233 According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office,
over one-third of California’s counties were already under court-ordered
jail population limits when the State enacted AB 109 and AB 117.234
Furthermore, many county jails already have a record littered with lax
oversight and faulty administration. 235 With an influx of offenders
entering the system, experts doubt county officials’ abilities to
effectively manage its jail population over the long term. 236 AB 109,
combined with the fact that jails do not offer the types of amenities
found in most prisons because they are built for stays under a year,237
has a strong potential to merely recycle issues of overcrowding and
unconstitutional facility conditions in the county jail system. 238
230. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS: A BLUEPRINT TO
SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END FEDERAL COURT OVERSIGHT, AND IMPROVE THE PRISON
SYSTEM 2, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
231. Id. at 15.
232. See CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 216, at 5–9 (highlighting CDCR’s
recent achievements in reducing the prison population).
233. See Harris Kenny & Adams Summers, Brown v. Plata Ruling Highlights Need for
Reform (Not Tax Increases), REASON FOUND. (June 2, 2011), http://reason.org/news/show/caprison-brown-v-plata (stating that transferring several thousand prisoners is not an easy task—
aside from the transfer’s huge costs, county prisons simply do not have enough space to
accommodate these prisoners without leading to overcrowding of these facilities); Gabrielson,
supra note 229 (“Few of California’s county jails have the luxury of unused space.”).
234. Kenny & Summers, supra note 233. See also Jens Erik Gould, As California Fights
Prison Overcrowding, Some See a Golden Opportunity, TIME (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2094840,00.html
(noting
that
counties,
specifically Los Angeles County, are apprehensive of the Realignment Plan’s effect on county
inmate populations and the counties’ capacity to house them).
235. See Gould, supra note 234 (discussing the county system’s predicted lack of space for the
influx in inmate numbers). See also Editorial, Get Ready, California Counties, Here Come the
Inmates, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-reentry-20110830 (“Where hopeful reformers see a new smart-on-crime paradigm, L.A. County
supervisors sense an all-too-familiar inadequately funded offloading of state problems onto the
counties.”).
236. See Kenny & Summers, supra note 233 (describing the challenges county facilities likely
will face in supporting an influx of inmates).
237. Norimitsu Onishi, In California Prison Overhaul, County Jails Face Bigger Load, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, at A8.
238. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (noting that many county jails are already
overcrowded).
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B. An Assessment of other Reactive Measures
States across the country have increasingly used reactive remedies as
a means to address significant prison overcrowding. As examples of
reactive remedies, a national trend toward reliance on interstate
transferring and private prison housing has provided a number of states
with the ability to limit their in-state populations once they start
overreaching capacity. 239 Many of these remedies, however, come with
negative consequences.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court in Olim v. Wakinekona upheld the
practice of transferring prisoners to different states. 240 Many states
continue to use interstate transferring in order to reduce overcrowding in
their prison systems. For instance, as of 2008, 54% of Hawaii’s prison
population was serving time in out-of-state prisons. 241 Additionally, in
2009, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections transferred 2000
prisoners to other states, and the state is continuing to transfer prisoners
to out-of-state facilities at high rates. 242 Nevertheless, as the dissenting
opinion in Olim recognized, state-to-state transferring results in
significantly undesirable social and emotional consequences for
prisoners, including increased isolation from friends and family
members. 243
Additionally, states have capitalized on the use of private prisons to
alleviate state prison numbers. 244 Private prisons have become
239. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERSTATE TRANSFER OF PRISON INMATES IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (Feb. 2006), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021242.pdf (concluding that
nearly every state’s department of corrections—forty-three of the forty-eight agencies that
responded to the survey—had inmates on transferred status at the time of the Department of
Justice’s survey). See also LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT: REDUCING
PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA 4 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.lao.gov/
reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511.pdf (noting that in May 2007, the California Legislature
revised State law to allow CDCR to involuntary transfer inmates to other states, and that the
Legislative Analyst Office recommended that these transfers continue until California alleviates
its prison overcrowding crisis).
240. 461 U.S. 238, 239 (1983). But see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (finding that
inmate transfers to mental hospitals implicated a protected liberty interest).
241. DEP’T OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF HAW. AT MANOA & DEP’T OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.
STATE OF HAW., HAWAII’S IMPRISONMENT POLICY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF PAROLEES WHO
WERE INCARCERATED IN-STATE AND ON THE MAINLAND 6 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://ag.hawaii.gov/cpja/files/2013/01/AH-UH-Mainland-Prison-Study-2011.pdf.
242. Natalie Hrubos, The Answer to Prison Overcrowding Is Not to Ship State Prisoners Out
of State, PHILA. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 22, 2012), http://uponfurtherreview.philadelphiabar.org/page/
Article?articleID=66ef846e-554a-4185-be84-fd0a08ce7535. For instance, in 2010, Pennsylvania
transferred 160 inmates to an out-of-state prison. Id.
243. Olim, 461 U.S. at 252–53 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Facing a transfer to a facility distant
from one’s home would separate the prisoner from social networks, thereby exposing the prisoner
to increased isolation and possible mental health issues. Id.
244. See Marc Lifsher, Increase in Inmates Opens Door to Private Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
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increasingly popular in the United States during the past several
decades, and states, including California, have contracted with
companies to construct and manage private prison facilities. 245 States
suffering from prison overcrowding may view this option as an
attractive method to reduce overpopulation, especially in light of the
fact that private facilities require less governmental oversight. 246
Private prisons can also offer states the opportunity to house prisoners
for significantly less money than if the states used government-run
facilities. For instance, Louisiana pays private prisons and county jails
approximately $24.39 per day for each inmate in their care, 247 less than
half of what it costs to incarcerate a prisoner in Louisiana’s state-run
prison. 248
While private prison organizations market their services on the
premise of improved prison conditions at a lower cost, 249 serious
defects exist surrounding this method of incarceration. First, a lack of
accountability and transparency can, and has, led to increased abuses in
private facilities. 250 Second, many private prisons face allegations of
mismanagement and dubious business conduct. 251 Finally, private
24, 2007, at A1 (noting that for decades, private prison company Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA) tried to contract with California to build private facilities, and eventually, after
securing a contract, it built two private facilities). See also CCA LODGINGS: CA, http://www.
cca.com/facilities/?state=CA (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (describing the location of the two
California CCA facilities—one in California City and the other in San Diego).
245. A Brief History of Private Prisons in Immigration Detention, DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons_note2 (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) [hereinafter A Brief History] (listing the emergence of other private prison organizations,
including the GEO Group, Inc. and Management and Training Corporation).
246. Private contractors are exempt from the requirement to comply with the Freedom of
Information Act and are protected from litigation from complex contracts. See The Influence of
the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (noting that a
lack of transparency and accountability is often present in private prison facilities).
247. Louisiana’s Prisons Sheriffs’ Delight: While Local Officials Cash in, Convicts Lose out,
ECONOMIST, June 26, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21556929.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., CCA OVERVIEW, http://www.cca.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (describing its
company as “protecting public safety, employing the best people in solid careers, rehabilitating
inmates, giving back to communities, and bringing innovative security to government
corrections—all while consistently saving hardworking taxpayers’ dollars”).
250. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441–42
(2005) (noting that because the owners of private correctional facilities are profit seeking, they
have greater motivation than their state-run counterparts to reduce spending on meeting inmates’
needs). See, e.g., A Brief History, supra note 245 (noting that in the Idaho “Gladiator School,” a
prison named for its reputation for violence and run by CCA, a prison surveillance camera
showed a man becoming knocked unconscious by another prisoner while the guards calmly stood
by).
251. See, e.g., Sarnata Reynolds, Immigration Detention: The Golden Goose for Private
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prison companies strongly lobby for harsher criminal laws, thereby
ironically contributing to the prison overcrowding epidemic that states
seek to remedy. 252
C. A Glance at Proactive Reform
There are two general ways in which states can proactively, instead
of reactively, implement prison reform: “front-end” and “back-end”
mechanisms. 253 Front-end mechanisms focus on how to keep nonviolent, low-risk offenders from entering the prison system, while backend efforts focus on how to effectively manage the rehabilitation of
prior offenders and prevent them from returning to the system.254
Front-end efforts include the diversion of low risk offenders by
increasing reliance on community service sanctions, electronic
monitoring, and day reporting centers, while reducing reliance on
requirements such as pre-trial detention, three strikes laws, and habitual
offender laws. 255 Back-end mechanisms involve parole eligibility,
which is commonly affected by truth-in-sentencing laws, sentence or
good-time credit programs, and infirmity-based release. 256
1. Proactive Reforms are More Effective than Reactive Mechanisms
Governor Brown has acknowledged that the improvement in
incarceration rates and prison conditions is, and continues to be, largely

Prisons, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amnesty-inter
national/private-prisons-immigration_b_875946.html (noting that CCA receives 40% of its
business from the federal government, including Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)). Furthermore, CCA and BOP have had a very close
relationship, as high-ranked BOP employees have discreetly left BOP and accepted lucrative
positions at CCA. Id. For example, Michael Quinlan, a former BOP director who left the agency
after a sexual harassment scandal, subsequently took a senior position at CCA (where he currently
is a senior vice president). Id.
252. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (describing the inhumane conditions in
California prisons as a result of the State’s harsh approach to criminal law).
253. ACLU, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND
COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 10–14 (2011), available at https://d3h9au4afozpag
cloudfront.net/files/assets/smartreformispossible_web.pdf; Klingele, supra note 21, at 486.
254. ACLU, SMART REFORM, supra note 253, at 10–12; Klingele, supra note 21, at 486.
255. ACLU SMART REFORM, supra note 253, at 12–14. Diversion of low risk offenders
prevents them from entering the system in the first place by placing them in community-based
programs, such as drug treatment facilities. Id.
256. Klingele, supra note 21, at 487–94. Inmates can earn sentence credit by participating in
prison programming or by abiding by prison regulations and procedures. Id. at 488–89. At least
thirty-one states authorize some form of earned release credit. Id. For example, some states have
increased the amount of credit that prisoners could earn for successfully completing certain
programs, while other states have expanded the class of inmates eligible to receive credit. Id. at
490–91.
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the result of the Supreme Court’s order in May 2011. 257 It is clear,
however, that California’s Realignment Plan, along with possible
alternative reactive remedies, is flawed. As previously discussed, using
reactive remedies to mitigate prison overcrowding can lead to further
human rights abuses. 258 Additionally, the cost of litigation throughout
the Brown proceedings imposed an extraordinary financial burden upon
the State. 259 Thus, one key lesson to glean from Brown is that the best
way to avoid cleaning up an administrative mess is to prevent one from
occurring in the first place.
Generally, it is illogical for states to put themselves in the position
where they must determine how to reactively respond to lacking
resources and overcrowded facilities. 260 The overall cost-effectiveness
of having fewer offenders imprisoned and diverting them into
community programs is supported by objective evidence, including the
experiences of states that have successfully implemented such
reforms. 261 On average, the cost of incarceration is over $20,000 more
than monitoring an offender by way of community-based treatment
programs. 262
Going forward, states should use both front-end and back-end means
to better achieve prisoner rehabilitation. 263 Using these techniques
often allows inmates to remain in their communities and receive more
257. Our View, supra note 226 (internal quotations omitted).
258. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing the inefficiencies associated with, and concerns
surrounding, reactive remedies to prison overcrowding).
259. See Margo Schlanger, The Political Economy of Prison and Jail Litigation, 18 PRISON
LEGAL NEWS 1, 3 (June 2007) (discussing the high cost associated with prisoner litigation).
260. See infra Part IV.C.1 (addressing the superiority of proactive reforms over reactive
measures).
261. See DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IS THE
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 6 (June
2002) (stating that it is cheaper to educate an inmate than to incarcerate them multiple times over
and finding that North Carolina, Virginia, and Kansas are exemplary states that made “farreaching substantive changes to laws governing sentencing and incarceration in the 1990s”). See
also Jessica Ramirez, Get Out of Jail, Free, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.thedaily
beast.com/newsweek/2009/03/11/get-out-of-jail-free.html (stating that parole and probation are
much cheaper alternatives to incarceration).
262. JUSTICE POLICY INST., PRUNING PRISONS: HOW CUTTING CORRECTIONS CAN SAVE
MONEY AND PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (May 2009), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf.
263. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 27–29 (June 2006), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/
files/resources/downloads/Confronting_Confinement.pdf (emphasizing the importance of
rehabilitation and its positive effect on inmate populations and communities in general).
Rehabilitation in a criminal context encompasses a number of features, including drug-treatment,
vocational, and training programs designed to reduce recidivism and prepare inmates for reassimilation. Amici Curiae CLEP, supra note 20, at 3.
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personalized services, while simultaneously allowing prisons to invest
saved money into more effective treatment programs. 264 By endorsing
rehabilitative services and programming for both inmates and parolees,
states can ensure that they are taking steps to reduce recidivism. 265
The question of whether the Brown Court’s holding will cause the
public’s “lock and key” mentality to shift to an endorsement of
proactive alternatives to incarceration deserves reflection. At a
minimum, it is possible that society will welcome creative and effective
ways to reduce crime. 266 As the answers to these questions play out in
Brown’s wake, it is beneficial to further assess the aforementioned
programs that states can implement to prevent crime, particularly a
successful rehabilitative model used by the Illinois Department of
Corrections. 267
2. What Does Work? An Example of Proactive Reform in Illinois
The use of proactive corrections reform, specifically rehabilitative
measures, is hardly novel. 268 Experts and scholars have been pushing
for such reform for years. 269 As states attempt to navigate the most
effective ways to implement proactive reforms, it is useful to look at
successful alternatives to incarceration. While many states have various
diversionary and rehabilitative programs, 270 this Subsection focuses on

264. See ACLU SMART REFORM, supra note 253, at 9 (stating that “[c]riminal justice policies
are more effective when crafted based on criminology or science rather than fear and emotion,”
and therefore rehabilitation and individual offender assessments are significantly effective).
265. By emphasizing rehabilitation, states can focus more attention on what indicators to look
for in assessing recidivist tendencies. Id. They can also invest savings into community programs
that help reduce recidivism. Id. at 14.
266. Mark Sherman, Calif. Ordered to Cut Its Inmate Population, MSNBC.COM (May 23,
2011), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/43140405/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/ (noting that
Brown’s ruling “comes amid efforts in many states, accelerated by budget gaps, to send fewer
people to prison in the first place”).
267. See Klingele, supra note 21, at 494 (highlighting that it is too early to determine whether
reforms implemented by states will be effective). See also infra notes 276–78 (assessing the
rehabilitative model used by the Illinois Department of Corrections).
268. See Sherman, supra note 266 (stating that California’s prison administration has been
ineffective).
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Alternative to Incarceration (ATI) Programs, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/ati_description.htm (last visited Sept.
29, 2012) (listing state-sponsored alternatives to incarceration, including mental illness programs,
pretrial services, drug and alcohol programs, and community services programs); About Cases:
Mission, CASES, http://www.cases.org/about/mission/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (describing
the forty years this New York organization has had working with alternative-to-incarceration
programs in the state and noting that addressing the root causes of crimes and helping offenders
reintegrate into society makes communities safer while saving taxpayer dollars).
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successful efforts employed by the Illinois prison system. 271
Not unique to Illinois, drug offenders are routinely housed alongside
those who have committed violent crimes as a result of deficient bed
space and poor infrastructural organization in correctional facilities.272
This setup promotes the criminogenic effect of prisons and significantly
contributes to overcrowding in almost every U.S. prison facility. 273
According to the Center for Health and Justice, illegal drug use “has
played a fundamental role in the population explosion within the
American justice system.” 274
To prevent drug offenders from
congesting prisons, Illinois implemented one promising front-end
proactive measure: diverting drug offenders from the traditional prison
system and into tailored treatment plans. 275
The Sheridan Correctional Center, an Illinois Department of
Corrections facility, is a medium security all-male prison that is
dedicated entirely to housing individuals dealing with substance
abuse. 276 In addition to providing its inmates with rehabilitative
services, this facility collaborates with community programs to help
reintegrate these individuals into society and ensure they receive
assistance upon release. 277 As a result, lower-level offenders who
otherwise would have been placed in traditional prison facilities are

271. One effective method of assessing effective reform is by measuring the reduction in
overall recidivism rates in the prison system. ACLU SMART REFORM, supra note 253, at 14.
272. See generally LISA BRAUDE ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH AND JUSTICE, NO ENTRY:
IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY THROUGH COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN
ILLINOIS 9–11 (2007), available at http://www.centerforhealthandjustice.org/IllinoisNoEntry_
Final.pdf [hereinafter NO ENTRY].
[C]urrent policies that incarcerate non-violent offenders with substance use disorders,
instead of treating their drug problems, only add to the burden of an already
overcrowded criminal justice system and unnecessarily cost taxpayers billions of
dollars. Accumulated research and experience have shown that supervised substance
abuse treatment is a viable alternative to incarceration for non-violent, drug-involved
offenders.
Id. at 9.
273. See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text (describing the criminogenic effect
prisons can have on inmates).
274. NO ENTRY, supra note 272, at 6.
275. See id. at 23 (recommending the use of diversionary programs for those with substance
abuse disorders rather than allowing them to enter the traditional justice system). See also infra
notes 281–83 and accompanying text (describing the apparent successes after Illinois opened the
Sheridan Correctional Center).
276. Sheridan Correctional Center, ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/
facilities/Pages/sheridancorrectionalcenter.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
277. See id. (noting examples of services, including academic programs, vocational training,
drug education, anger management groups, drug and alcohol treatment programs, therapy,
parenting classes, veteran groups, Bible study programs, joint programs with clinical reentry
management services, and community substance abuse treatment organizations).
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separated into this particularized facility based on their needs and
provided with services to help prevent them from reoffending. 278
At first glance, it may appear as though this method is fiscally
ineffective. The cost to house these men is significantly higher than in
other facilities—Illinois must pay $34,733 per year to house an adult in
the Sheridan Correctional Center,279 while it costs the State $19,492 to
house an adult offender in the maximum security Menard Correctional
Center. 280 However, enacting proactive reforms, such as the use of
treatment centers and drug programs, as an alternative to traditional
incarceration will ultimately help end the cycle of recidivism. With
more tailored treatment options, individuals can receive the care needed
to help resolve the underlying causes of their criminal tendencies.281
The numbers behind this particular proactive program are telling:
individuals treated at the Sheridan Correctional Center are 40% less
likely than other Illinois inmates to reoffend one year after their release
and 85% less likely to commit another crime in their lifetime. 282 This
downturn in recidivism will in turn reduce the fiscal cost of housing
these individuals in the future and the social cost of allowing individuals
who are not sufficiently rehabilitated to reenter society. 283
Although Illinois and other states have started to implement proactive
reforms to counter prison overcrowding, public support is still needed if
such programs are to achieve long-term success. 284 Convincing the rest
of society that an emphasis on rehabilitation rather than harsh
corrections and sentencing policies is more effective will not be easy.
The past few decades have shown that an uphill battle lies ahead.285
278. Id. See also Robert Weiner & Daphne Baille, Drug Treatment an Alternative to Prison,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at 18 (attributing declines in recidivism rates for men treated in
the Sheridan Correctional Facility to counseling and job training).
279. Sheridan Correctional Center, supra note 276.
280. Menard Correctional Center, ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/
facilities/Pages/menardcorrectionalcenter.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).
281. See generally OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG COURTS: A SMART
APPROACH TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (May 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/drug_courts_fact_sheet_5-31-11.pdf (noting that drug courts, or
treatment centers that receive diverted offenders, help treat many of the underlying causes of
criminal behavior, in turn reducing recidivism).
282. Weiner & Baille, supra note 278.
283. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text (noting the improvement in public safety
when effectively rehabilitating inmates and preventing high levels of recidivism).
284. See supra note 149 (discussing the public’s perception on crime and its impact on
legislative enactment); Klingele, supra note 21, at 495 (stating that there are already some
indications that the public may not be eager to embrace the newest rounds of early release
legislation).
285. See Beth Caldwell & Ellen C. Caldwell, “Superpredators” and “Animals”—Images and
California’s “Get Tough on Crime” Initiatives, 2011 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 61, 61 (arguing
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Hopefully, in time, the public’s view of corrections will begin to evolve
now that states are faced with Brown’s ultimatum: release or reform.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Brown, state legislatures and the public must confront
the stark reality that inhumane, unconstitutional living conditions in our
nation’s prisons will not persist without a remedy. Despite California’s
near-term progress in its realignment efforts, further permanent reform
is needed. California and other states must reconsider harsh criminal
policies that contribute to excessive incarceration. The “lock the door
and throw away the key” mentality has led to overreliance on
incarceration, which continues to deplete state resources, perpetuate
criminogenic prison environments, and inhibit effective rehabilitation of
offenders. Brown’s landmark decision should incentivize legislatures to
address the causes and implications of excessive incarceration and to
implement proactive reform policies, including both front-end and backend techniques, as opposed to merely relying on reactive measures. In
turn, this shift will hopefully enlighten the public to reconsider the
current state of corrections and advocate for a more humane,
rehabilitative, and cost-effective prison system.

that criminal justice policy has been influenced by popularized misrepresentations of offenders as
“superpredators”). Certain reform program features, such as transparency, public accountability,
and sustainability help garner public support. Klingele, supra note 21, at 515–21.

